

CHAPTER-II

PERFORMANCE AUDIT

2.1 Performance Audit on Modernisation of Police Force in Jharkhand

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HOME, JAIL AND DISASTER MANAGEMENT DEPARTMENT

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Executive summary

The scheme of Modernisation of Police Force (MPF) was launched in order to supplement the efforts of the State Government to modernise the police force to effectively face the emerging challenges to internal security and to reduce the dependence of the State Government on the Army and Central Armed Police Forces (CAPF) to tackle the problems of internal security and law and order. A Performance Audit on the implementation of MPF Scheme and other modernisation activities undertaken by the State Government covering the period 2013-18 revealed the following:

The State Government had not framed a State Police Act to replace the Police Act, 1861 as of October 2019. The State Police Board has not been created to frame broad policy guidelines and evaluate organisational performance against identified performance indicators. Area specific internal security scheme to deal with problems of public order and internal security has also not been framed.

(Paragraph 2.1.7)

Recommendation: The Department may frame a State Police Act, set up the State Police Board, identify performance indicators for evaluation of organisational performance and develop area-specific internal security schemes in a time-bound manner.

Preparation of a strategic plan to identify resource gaps and setting up milestones to bridge these by mapping the assets and resources has just begun in 2019-20. As a result, though the Department prepared Annual Action Plans (AAPs) within the tentative allocation of funds communicated by MHA during 2013-18, these plans did not flow from any long-term need assessment and planning. Further, the AAPs were submitted with delays ranging from 99 to 168 days.

(Paragraph 2.1.8)

Recommendation: The Department should complete the preparation of Strategic plan for modernisation of police in a time-bound manner from which the AAPs should be drawn up, prioritising the most deficient components of the Scheme.

The Department did not release State share of ₹ 52.25 crore under MPF Scheme and could not utilise Central share of ₹ 4.22 crore during 2013-18. There was loss of central grants of ₹ 21.31 crore (2016-18) due to poor pace of utilisation. As a result, the AAPs were not fully implemented during 2013-18.

(Paragraph 2.1.9)

Recommendation: The Department should ensure that Central funds are utilised in time and full component of State share is released.

The State police was dependent on phased out weapons for operational purpose due to increase in shortage of modern weapons from 28 *per cent* (April 2013) to 32 *per cent* (April 2018). Besides, distribution of arms and ammunition among the field units was skewed.

(Paragraphs 2.1.10.1 and 2.1.10.4)

The shortage of BP jackets ranged between 43 and 100 *per cent* in 12 test-checked State Armed Police Force Battalions thereby increasing the risk of casualties during operations.

(Paragraph 2.1.11.1)

The Department was yet to fix norms for different kinds of vehicles to be attached with police units keeping in view the hilly terrain and jungle tracks of the State besides risk of landmines during Naxal operations. Out of 545 Special Report Cases analysed in 41 test-checked Police stations/Out posts, the response time was more than two hours in 116 (22 *per cent*) cases.

(Paragraphs 2.1.12.1 and 2.1.12.3)

The Department could not maintain the minimum level of efficiency in communication due to shortage of communication sets which ranged between 37 and 71 *per cent*. Further, the State police was mainly dependent on analog sets (91 *per cent*), which are susceptible to interception, for communication.

(Paragraphs 2.1.13.1 and 2.1.13.2)

Recommendation: The Department should complete the mapping of assets and resources and identify sources of funds to procure weapons, communication sets, BP jackets and other security equipment and expedite the purchases to adequately equip the State police forces.

Counter Insurgency and Anti-Terrorism trainings were provided to police personnel who were above the stipulated age norms. Further, proper training was not being imparted to police personnel due to absence of instructors, training equipment and other facilities in the training institutes. Sufficient target practice was not provided to police personnel due to shortage of ammunition and non-availability of firing ranges. Besides, 35 *per cent* of police personnel, imparted training in four test-checked training institutes, could not clear the final tests.

(Paragraph 2.1.14)

Recommendation: The Department should ensure that the training institutions are adequately equipped with modern systems and facilities to impart quality training to the police personnel.

Forensic set up was not up to the mark at the district, regional and State level. The State Forensic Science Development Board, responsible for ensuring

continuous development of forensic science services, remained non-functional after its creation in September 2011. The Department did not set up five divisions of State Forensic Science Laboratory, obtain NABL accreditation and finalise the “Jharkhand State Forensic Science Laboratory Service Rules 2012 (Recruitment Rules)”. Vacancies of 64 *per cent* in technical posts and 93 *per cent* in non-technical posts coupled with shortage of facilities resulted in delay in analysis of exhibits for more than five years (19 *per cent* involving 934 out of 4,795 pending cases) and for one to five years (56 *per cent* involving 2,681 out of 4,795 pending cases).

(Paragraph 2.1.15)

Recommendation: The Department should establish the remaining five divisions of the SFSL, appoint technical and non-technical staff, take action to get NABL accreditation and finalise the “Jharkhand State Forensic Science Laboratory Service Rules 2012 (Recruitment Rules)” on priority.

Housing facilities for police personnel were not sufficient and could accommodate only 8.66 *per cent* of police personnel. Construction of five police lines at Giridih, Hazaribag (JAP-7), Koderma, Latehar and Lohardaga could not be completed and made operational even after 11 years of commencement despite incurring expenditure of ₹ 170.21 crore. Test-checked Police stations and Out posts lacked basic facilities like buildings, magazines, separate lock-up, boundary wall, watch tower, barbed wire fencing etc.

(Paragraph 2.1.16)

Recommendation: All the incomplete civil works should be completed at the earliest and put to use. Survey to identify infrastructural damages/deficiencies in Police stations, Out posts and Police lines may be completed at the earliest and a time bound plan should be drawn up to address the shortcomings.

The State police continue to be dependent on the CAPFs for curbing the Naxal menace. Analysis of operations in the test-checked districts revealed that 69 *per cent* operations were conducted solely by CAPFs, 25 *per cent* operations jointly by CAPF and the State forces and only six *per cent* solely by the State forces. JJ (STF), created especially to check Naxal activities, participated in joint operations with CAPFs and the State police forces. Thus, the State could not reduce dependency on CAPFs.

(Paragraph 2.1.17.2)

Recommendation: The Department should review the preparedness, skills and competencies of the State police to carry out effective Naxal operations and deal with problems of public order and internal security. The young troop leaders and trained constabulary should be exposed to the best available training similar to the training imparted to CAPFs.

2.1.1 Introduction

Government of India (GoI) launched the “Modernisation of Police Force (MPF) Scheme” in 1969-70 to supplement the efforts of the State Government to modernise the police forces to effectively face the emerging challenges to internal security and bring about improvement in maintenance of law and order. The MPF Scheme was modified (February 2001) with enhanced allocation for a period of 10 years up to 2009-10. The Scheme was further extended¹ up to 2016-17. The Scheme was again extended (December 2017) up to 2019-20 as a sub-scheme viz., ‘Assistance to States for Modernisation of Police’ under the umbrella scheme of ‘Modernisation of Police Forces’. Under the Scheme, States are grouped (February 2013) under two categories² for the purpose of funding. Jharkhand was kept under category ‘B’ and was eligible for financial assistance of 60:40 (Centre:State).

Up to 2016-17, the two major objectives of MPF Scheme were to meet the deficiencies in various facets of police administration as identified by Bureau of Police Research and Development (BPR&D) in the year 2000 and to reduce the dependence of the State Government on the Army and Central Armed Police Forces (CAPF) to control internal security and maintain law and order. From 2017-18, the objective of the Scheme was gradual reduction in the dependence of the State Government on the Army and CAPF to control internal security and maintain law and order by equipping the State police forces adequately through development of relevant infrastructure. The scheme was intended to make the state police more efficient and effective by modernising police forces under eight components namely mobility, weaponry, equipment, communication, training, Forensic Science Laboratory, buildings and computerisation.

In Jharkhand, the State police is responsible for protecting a population of more than three crore spread over a geographical area of 79,839 square kilometres.

During 2013-18, the State had incurred an expenditure of ₹ 945.60 crore on modernisation of the State police which included ₹ 99.56 crore (Central share: ₹ 82.76 crore and State share: ₹ 16.80 crore) under MPF Scheme and ₹ 846.04 crore from other Central and State Plan schemes.


2.1.2 Organisational structure

The Secretary is the administrative head of the Home, Jail and Disaster Management Department (the Department) under which the State police functions. The Director General of Police (DGP) heads the Police Headquarters (PHQ) and is assisted by ADG (Modernisation) for implementation of the MPF

¹ In December 2009 up to 2010-11, in December 2010 up to 2011-12 and in February 2013 up to 2016-17.

² Category ‘A’ (90:10 between Centre and State): Jammu & Kashmir and eight North-East States including Sikkim; Category ‘B’ (60:40 between Centre and State): remaining States.

Scheme. A State Level Empowered Committee (SLEC³) oversees the planning of the Scheme. The organisational structure is shown in the organogram below:



2.1.3 Audit Objectives

The Performance Audit was conducted to ascertain whether:

- implementation of the MPF scheme and other modernisation activities carried out by the Department were effective and there was improvement in the functioning of the State police; and
- the State successfully reduced its dependence on the Army and CAPF to control internal security and maintain law and order.

2.1.4 Audit criteria

The audit criteria were derived from the following sources:

- Scheme guidelines and orders issued thereunder by Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA);
- Reports of BPR&D;
- Annual Action Plans (AAPs) and periodical reports/returns prescribed under the scheme;
- The Police Act 1861, Jharkhand Police Manual, Jharkhand Public Works Department Code, CPWD Manual and circulars/instructions issued thereunder; and
- Draft Model Police Act and draft Police Manual for those criteria which are not covered under The Police Act 1861/Jharkhand Police Manual.

³ Headed by Chief Secretary with Development Commissioner, Home Secretary, Finance Secretary and DGP as members.

2.1.5 Justification for conducting the Performance Audit (PA)

Audit had conducted a PA on MPF Scheme in 2009 covering the period 2004-09. The audit findings were featured in **Paragraph 1.3** of the Audit Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India (Civil and Commercial) for the year ended 31 March 2009, Government of Jharkhand (GoJ), highlighting lapses in implementation of the MPF Scheme and the following audit recommendations were made:

- (i) The State Government should prepare a roadmap including a long-term Perspective/Strategic Plan for modernisation of its police force, after analysing the gaps and requirement.
- (ii) Financial management should be streamlined to ensure timely utilisation of funds for the intended purpose.
- (iii) Quantifiable targets and specific timelines should be fixed for upgradation of weapons, mobility and communication systems and progress monitored.
- (iv) Civil works like construction of residential buildings, police lines, police stations/outposts should be taken up and completed on a war footing.
- (v) Adequate training should be planned and ensured to police personnel for addressing the changing needs of the police force.
- (vi) The monitoring mechanism should be strengthened to ensure implementation of the Scheme in an effective and time bound manner.

The Audit Report was discussed by the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) in July 2012 and PAC recommendations were awaited as of March 2019. After discussion, Police Headquarters (PHQ) submitted (November 2012) the explanatory notes to PAC without comments on audit recommendations. The Principal Accountant General (Audit), Jharkhand furnished (January 2013) its comments to PHQ and PAC on the explanatory notes. The Audit Report has not been taken up for further discussion by the PAC as of March 2019.

The present follow-up PA was conducted to ascertain whether remedial measures were initiated by the Home, Jail and Disaster Management Department on the previous audit findings and there was improvement in the functioning of the State Police. The follow-up action, if any, with respect to the audit recommendations of March 2009, have been discussed under the relevant sections of the PA report.

2.1.6 Scope and methodology of audit

The PA on implementation of MPF scheme and other modernisation activities carried out by the State Government during 2013-18 was conducted (October 2018 to May 2019) by test-check of the records in the offices of the Secretary (Home), DGP, DG (Training), DG (Special Branch), DG (Jharkhand Armed Police), ADG (Wireless and Technical services), Director (State

Forensic Science Laboratory) and Jharkhand Police Housing Corporation Ltd. (JPHCL). Besides, nine⁴ out of 24 districts (SP offices) were selected through Probability Proportional to Size (PPS) sampling method for audit scrutiny. In the selected nine districts, records of all the 12 State Armed Police Force (SAPF) battalions, seven out of nine training institutes, 54 out of 241 Police Stations (PSs) and nine out of 36 Out Posts (OPs) were examined. The sampling technique adopted and units selected are detailed in *Appendix 2.1.1*. Joint physical verification of PSs, OPs, districts and battalion headquarters was also carried out along with departmental officials to ascertain ground realities.

An entry conference was conducted (September 2018) with the Principal Secretary, Home, Jail and Disaster Management Department in which audit scope and methodology was discussed. An exit conference was also held (October 2019) with the Additional Chief Secretary (ACS) of the Department to ascertain the views of the Department. Replies of the Department have been suitably incorporated in the Report.

Audit findings

2.1.7 New Police Act not framed

The draft Model Police Act (MPA), 2006 framed by the Police Act Drafting Committee was sent (October 2006) to the States by MHA for framing either a new Police Act or amendment in the existing Indian Police Act, 1861 to transform the police into a professionally competent and service-oriented organisation. Thereafter, the draft Act was reviewed and a draft Model Police Bill, 2015 had been prepared and placed on the website of BPR&D for the State Governments to formulate a new Police Act or amend their existing Act on the lines of the draft Model Police Bill. The draft Model Police Bill, 2015 contained provisions regarding:

- (i) creation of a State Police Board to frame broad policy guidelines for promoting efficient, effective, responsive and accountable policing and to evaluate the organisational performance against identified performance indicators;
- (ii) preparation of a five-year strategic policing plan identifying the policing objectives sought to be achieved in the five year period and an action plan for their implementation, and annual policing plans setting out the priorities for the year based on the Strategic Plan;
- (iii) preparation of area-specific internal security scheme to deal with problems of public order, disaster management and security;
- (iv) formation of Crime Investigation Department, State Intelligence Department and Special crime investigation units at State, district and PS level for effective prevention and investigation of crimes;

⁴ Deoghar, Dhanbad, East Singhbhum, Godda, Hazaribag, Jamtara, Koderma, Latehar and Ranchi.

- (v) establishment of a State Bureau of Police Research & Development which would *inter alia* prepare a five-year perspective plan to modernise and upgrade police infrastructure with the objective of enhancing the professional competence and efficient management of the police service.

State Government has not framed a State Police Act due to which key provisions of the draft Model Police Bill 2015 could not be implemented

Audit observed that the State Government had not framed a State Police Act to replace the Police Act, 1861 as of October 2019. Thus, the provisions contained in the draft Model Police Bill which *inter alia* included creation of a State Police Board to frame broad policy guidelines and evaluate organisational performance against identified performance indicators and framing of an area-specific internal security scheme to deal with problems of public order and internal security were yet to be implemented. In reply, the Department stated (October 2019) that preparation of a Police Act for Jharkhand was under active consideration of the State Government.

Recommendation: The Department may frame a State Police Act, set up the State Police Board, identify performance indicators for evaluation of organisational performance and develop area-specific internal security schemes in a time-bound manner.

2.1.8 Deficiencies in planning

2.1.8.1 Strategic Plan

As per the Scheme guidelines, MPF is based on the core principle of one action plan for the programme irrespective of the number of schemes contributing to the programme in a State. The guidelines (November 2010) envisage preparation of a five-year State strategic plan that assesses needs and resources. The Plan should include programme targets for five years along with financial requirements, component-wise implementation targets and activities to be undertaken. It also includes resource planning comprising of component-wise total requirement of funds and sources of funding viz., funding from MHA, Finance Ministry, GoI and the State government. From the Strategic Plan, an Annual Action Plan (AAP) for MPF scheme needs to be prepared each year after identification of gaps, deficiencies and review of previous year plans, for approval by GoI.

State Government did not prepare a strategic plan during 2013-18. Annual plans were therefore not based on any long-term strategic planning

Audit noticed that PHQ did not prepare a strategic plan during 2013-18 as it had not done any asset or resource mapping at district and police station levels to identify the resource gaps, link it with BPR&D norms, identify the possible sources of funds and carry out a holistic evaluation of the organisation so as to set up milestones within which such gaps would be bridged. Thus, the annual plans submitted to GoI for MPF scheme were not based on any long-term strategic planning. Absence of a strategic plan has restricted the flexibility of the Department to draw up need-based AAPs to meet deficiencies in various components such as weaponry, communication, security equipment, FSL and

housing as limitation of funds under MPF Scheme could not be adequately supplemented from the State budget.

Non-preparation of five-year perspective plan (2005-10) was also highlighted **vide Paragraph 1.3.6.1 of CAG's Audit Report for the year 2008-09**. Due to lack of planning, many important activities related to modernisation have either been delayed considerably or not implemented at all as mentioned in succeeding paras.

During the exit conference (October 2019), the ADG (Modernisation) stated that a survey for asset or resource mapping at district and police station levels has been taken up in 2019-20 and is presently under progress. The ACS of the Department further added (October 2019) that a holistic blueprint of the organisation would be framed and once completed along with the survey, the resource gaps would be addressed.

2.1.8.2 Annual Action Plans

The Scheme guidelines prescribe a calendar for AAP and budget cycle to ensure that there is adequate time for consultation and review process. Delay in approval of AAPs delays release of funds, which in turn impacts programme implementation and fund utilisation.

Annual Action Plan (AAP) under MPF Scheme is sanctioned by the High Powered Committee (HPC) of MHA. Annual plans are forwarded to HPC through State Level Empowered Committee (SLEC) headed by the Chief Secretary of GoJ. MHA, while intimating the tentative annual Central fund allocation, was to invite Annual Action Plan from the State Governments by 31 December of the previous financial year. The Department was required to submit AAP to MHA by 15 January of the previous financial year after its approval by SLEC so that funds could be released in time and targets envisaged under the scheme could be achieved. MHA was to approve AAP by 30 April in order to release the first instalment (50 *per cent*) of Central share in May - June and second instalment (50 *per cent*) in September - October of the financial year.

Audit observed that PHQ prepared AAPs under MPF Scheme after ascertaining the requirements from field units and other branches of police and thereafter prioritising demand at PHQ level within the tentative annual allocation communicated by MHA. Deficiencies noticed in preparation of AAPs were as under:

- Audit noticed persistent delays in submission of AAPs by the Department leading to delays in its approval by MHA and release of Central share. AAPs were submitted to MHA with a delay of approximately five months. There were also considerable delays in approval of plans by MHA with consequential impact on release of Central funds. There were further delays in release of Central share by the State government as shown in **Table 1**.

Table 1: Delay in submission and approval of AAPs and release and sanction of Central share

Year	Due date of submission of AAP	Date of submission to MHA	Delay in submission in days	Date of approval by MHA	Days taken by MHA to approve AAPs after its submission by the State	Dates of release of Central share	Period of sanction of expenditure by State Government
2013-14	15.1.2013	1.6.2013	137	20.12.2013	202	23.12.2013	6.3.2014
						28.2.2014	3.9.2014
						12.3.2014	12.8.2014
2014-15	15.1.2014	26.6.2014	162	25.8.2014 ⁵	60	5.8.2014	22.1.2015/21.3.2015
						27.8.2014	29.12.2014
						9.10.2014	21.3.2017
						17.3.2015	11.3.2016
2015-16	15.1.2015	24.4.2015	99	22.7.2015	88	9.9.2015	4.12.2015
						17.9.2015	4.12.2015
						27.1.2016	21.10.2016
2016-17	15.1.2016	25.5.2016	129	28.6.2016	34	No release	
2017-18	15.1.2017	3.7.2017	168	6.11.2017	125	No release	

(Source: AAPs and release/ sanction letters)

Audit further observed that:

- Out of the total Central funds of ₹ 86.98 crore released to the State Government during 2013-14 to 2015-16, ₹ 28.57 crore (32.8 per cent) was released in the last quarter of the concerned financial year. Further, out of the funds released in the last quarter, ₹ 11.55 crore (40.4 per cent) was released in the month of March. As a result the State government was left with hardly any time to utilise the amount within the financial year necessitating revalidation of the unspent sums in subsequent years. This has contributed to the retention of unspent balances every year. The State government also considerably delayed the release of funds to the implementing agencies. Central share (₹ 7.77 crore) for 2013-14 released by GoI in March 2014 was released by the State Government only in August 2014. Central share (₹ 1.87 crore) for 2014-15 released by GoI in March 2015 was released by the State only in March 2016. Further, incentive/pool funds for 2013-14 released by GoI in October 2014 was revalidated and released by the State Government only in March 2017.
- For FY 2014-15, while intimating the tentative annual allocation, MHA asked (10 March 2014) the State government to submit the AAP. PHQ submitted (4 June 2014) AAP to the Home Department, GoJ which in turn sent it to MHA on 26 June 2014 after SLEC approval on 17 June 2014. High Powered Committee (HPC) of MHA approved (1 July 2014) AAP which was communicated to the State government on 25 August 2014.

Delayed submission of plans by GoJ resulted in delays in approval by MHA which in turn impacted the timely release and utilisation of funds resulting in short utilisation and slow pace of programme implementation

⁵ The High Powered Committee of MHA during discussion of AAP for 2014-15 on 1 July 2014, instructed for revisions in the plan. The revised plan was communicated on 25 August 2014.

- MHA asked (28 April 2017) the State government to submit AAP for 2017-18. PHQ submitted (7 June 2017) AAP to the Home Department, GoJ and SLEC approved the AAP in its meeting on 15 June 2017. Subsequently, the Home Department, GoJ submitted (3 July 2017) AAP to MHA. HPC approved (21 July 2017) AAP which was communicated to the State government on 6 November 2017 by MHA.

It can be seen from the above facts that neither MHA nor the State government adhered to the AAP calendar. There were significant delays on the part of MHA in calling for the plans as well as submission and approval of AAPs which resulted in late release of Central share by MHA. Further, the Department also consumed much time in granting sanctions and releasing the funds to the implementing agencies. As such, the implementing agencies were left with insufficient time to utilise the funds during the year, which affected timely implementation of AAPs, accumulation of unspent balances every year and consequent short/ non-release of Central share in the succeeding years which are discussed in Paragraph 2.1.9.2.

Delays up to 111 days in submission of AAPs was also highlighted vide **Paragraph 1.3.6.2 of CAG's Audit Report for the year 2008-09**. The situation has not improved as evidenced during the current audit which showed delay of 168 days during 2017-18. While accepting the audit observation, the Department stated (October 2019) that it is making efforts to improve the preparation of AAPs.

- Audit also noticed deficiencies in preparation of the AAPs as critical components which should have been accorded priority while planning were either not provided for or less provision was made.
 - PHQ planned (December 2012) to procure 13,928 main strike weapons⁶ and 3,647 area weapons⁷ during 2013-18 under the MPF Scheme. Against these, provision for only 6,903 (50 *per cent*) main strike weapons⁸ and 100 (three *per cent*) area weapons⁹ were included in AAPs during 2013-18.

PHQ stated (August 2019) that less provision was made in AAPs due to limited outlay under the MPF Scheme. The contention of PHQ was not acceptable as weaponry is a vital component in the modernisation effort and the State Government could have prioritised procurement of weapons by earmarking a portion of the funds provided for civil works from the State budget. During the exit conference (October 2019), the ACS of the

⁶ 5.56 Insas Rifle: 1,353, AK 47: 6,028, 5.56 SG 553: 250, Sniper Rifle: 480, 9 mm Sig/Auto Pistols: 5,817.

⁷ MP5 A3/A4: 1,150, 5.56 Insas LMG: 2,275 and 51 mm Mortar: 222.

⁸ 5.56 Insas Rifle: 4,021, AK 47: 1,715, 5.56 SG 553: 11, Sniper Rifle: Nil and 9 mm Sig/Auto Pistols: 1,156.

⁹ MP5 A3/A4: Nil, 5.56 Insas LMG: 100 and 51 mm Mortar: Nil.

Department stated that action would be taken to procure the required weapons.

- Forensic Science Laboratories (FSL) being extremely essential for the police, the HPC of MHA recommended (June 2013 and July 2014) that sufficient provision for FSL be made in the AAPs. However, the Department did not make any provision for FSL in AAPs during 2013-15 and 2017-18 except for a sum of ₹ 2.50 crore¹⁰ during 2015-17 for purchase of FSL equipment. As such, modernisation of FSL within the State, necessary for speedy scientific investigation of cases, was not given due attention as discussed in Paragraph 2.1.15.

Recommendation: The Department should complete the preparation of Strategic plan for modernisation of police in a time-bound manner from which the AAPs should be drawn up, prioritising the most deficient and critical components of the Scheme.

2.1.9 Financial management

The laid out procedure in MPF Scheme is that after approval of AAPs, GoI releases funds to the State Government which in turn is required to release its share accordingly to the departmental authorities. Under MPF scheme, the Central and State government were to share the expenditure in the ratio of 60:40 from 2012-13 onwards. A condition was imposed to release the funds for subsequent years only after receipt of utilisation certificates of previous years failing which a sum equivalent to the unutilised amount would be deducted from the Central share of the following year. For procurement of arms and ammunition, Central Government releases approved amounts in annual plans directly to the Ordnance Factory Depots of the Government of India.

Modernisation of Police Forces was sought to be achieved by the State Government by providing adequate and modern equipment, vehicles, arms and ammunition to its forces and by construction of buildings. The modernisation efforts were to be funded from Centrally Sponsored schemes (CSS), Central Plan schemes (CPS) and the State Plan (SP).

2.1.9.1 Budgetary support to modernisation of police force

- As per Scheme guidelines (2010), standard books of accounts (Cash Book, Journal, Ledger etc.) shall be maintained by PHQ for MPF funds on cash basis as per accounting standards of Institute of Chartered Accountants of India. Further, standard ledger heads for each component and sub-ledger heads for all categories under these components shall be maintained in order to keep proper financial information.

¹⁰ 2015-16: ₹ 1.30 crore; and 2016-17: ₹ 1.20 crore

In contravention of the Scheme guidelines, the Department maintained single books of account for all funds allotted under modernisation head from different schemes, rendering monitoring of component-wise achievement difficult

Separate provision for MPF Scheme was not made in the State budget

Audit noticed that the Department did not maintain separate books of accounts including component-wise ledger for MPF funds as required under the Scheme guidelines. Instead, the Department maintained single books of account for all funds allotted under modernisation head from different schemes. As a result, audit could not segregate component-wise utilisation of MPF fund *vis-a-vis* amount approved under AAPs during 2013-18.

Thus, the Department could not monitor the component-wise physical achievement *vis-à-vis* approvals in AAPs and timely utilisation of MPF fund in the absence of separate books of accounts and component-wise ledger for MPF Scheme.

- Separate provision for MPF Scheme was not made in the State budget. Instead, it was clubbed with provisions made under various Centrally Sponsored schemes (CSS), Central Plan schemes (CPS) and State Plan schemes meant for modernisation of police (*Appendix 2.1.2*). Expenditure on plan (Construction) and non-plan (purchases) components from various funds during 2013-18 is shown in **Table 2**:

Table 2: Budget provision and expenditure

Components of MPF scheme	Budget Provision	Expenditure on modernisation of State police			
		CSS	CPS	State Plan	Total
Non-Plan	272.87	29.31	12.48	185.56	227.35
Plan	779.34	91.52	35.72	591.01	718.25
Total	1052.21	120.83	48.20	776.57	945.60

(Source: Detailed Appropriation Accounts)

While accepting the audit observations, the Department stated (October 2019) that it would open a separate ledger for MPF funds which would help in better monitoring of expenditure.

2.1.9.2 Utilisation of MPF Scheme funds

As per MHA's instructions issued along with the annual tentative allocation, Supplementary and Special Modernisation Plans¹¹ were also to be submitted which would be operationalised subject to furnishing of utilisation certificates and availability of funds.

The Department submitted Supplementary and Special Modernisation Plans in addition to AAPs for which funds were released. During 2013-16, MHA released ₹ 9.49 crore¹² against Supplementary/Special Plans and ₹ 21.37 crore¹³ as incentive/additional fund over approved AAPs. Details of AAPs, Supplementary and Special Plans, releases and expenditure during 2013-18 are shown in **Tables 3A** and **3B**:

¹¹ Supplementary plan equivalent to 20 per cent of AAP and Special Plans (for serious internal security challenges, if any).

¹² 2013-14: Supplementary plan - ₹ 3.42 crore, 2014-15: Supplementary and Special plan - ₹ 4.35 crore and 2015-16: Supplementary plan - ₹ 1.72 crore.

¹³ 2014-15: Incentive - ₹ 7.77 crore and 2015-16: Additional fund - ₹ 13.60 crore.

Table 3A- AAP, Supplementary and Special Plans approved by MHA

₹ in crore (CS: Central share and SS: State share)

Year	AAP			Supplementary and Special Plans			Total		
	CS	SS	Total	CS	SS	Total	CS	SS	Total
2013-14	26.61	17.66	44.27	5.24	3.60	8.84	31.85	21.26	53.11
2014-15	22.56	15.05	37.61	14.78	10.61	25.39	37.34	25.66	63.00
2015-16	8.54	5.69	14.23	9.14	6.09	15.23	17.68	11.78	29.46
2016-17	8.54	5.69	14.23	1.71	1.14	2.85	10.25	6.83	17.08
2017-18	11.23	7.51	18.74	2.24	1.51	3.75	13.47	9.02	22.49
Total	77.48	51.60	129.08	33.11	22.95	56.06	110.59	74.55	185.14

(Source: Approved MPF Plans)

Table 3B- Release and utilisation

(₹ in crore)

Year	Amount released			Amount utilised			Amount remain unutilised		
	CS	SS	Total	CS	SS	Total	CS	SS	Total
2013-14	29.86 ¹⁴	1.79	31.65	18.67	1.79	20.46	11.19	0.00	11.19
2014-15	34.68 ¹⁵	13.69	48.37	29.38	12.31	41.69	5.30	1.38	6.68
2015-16	22.44 ¹⁶	6.82	29.26	19.61	2.70	22.31	2.83	4.12	6.95
2016-17	0.00 ¹⁷	0.00	0.00	8.68	0.00	8.68	(-) 8.68	0.00	(-) 8.68
2017-18	0.00 ¹⁸	0.00	0.00	6.42	0.00	6.42	(-) 6.42	0.00	(-) 6.42
Total	86.98	22.30	109.28	82.76	16.80	99.56	4.22	5.50	9.72

(Source: Information furnished by PHQ and MHA release orders).

 From **Tables 3A** and **3B**, it can be seen that:

(i) In none of the years did the Centre or the State contribute their full complement of funds. Against the State matching share of ₹ 74.55 crore, the Department released only ₹ 22.30 crore (30 per cent) leading to short release of ₹ 52.25 crore.

(ii) Due to non-utilisation of Central share released up to 2015-16, Central share of ₹ 21.31 crore¹⁹ was not released by MHA during 2016-18. Resultantly, the Department did not release State share of ₹ 15.85 crore. This adversely affected implementation of AAPs for 2016-18 as discussed in Paragraphs 2.1.11.1, 2.1.11.2 and 2.1.12.2 wherein non-procurement of Bullet Proof Jackets, metal detectors and motor cycles, has been pointed out.

(iii) Out of Central share of ₹ 86.98 crore released during 2013-15, the Department could not utilise ₹ 39.56 crore²⁰ (45 per cent) during the same years mainly due to delayed release by MHA and delays (ranging from 2 to 29

¹⁴ AAP: ₹ 26.44 crore and Supplementary plan: ₹ 3.42 crore.

¹⁵ AAP: ₹ 22.56 crore, Supplementary and Special plan: ₹ 4.35 and Incentive: ₹ 7.77 crore.

¹⁶ AAP: ₹ 7.12 crore and Supplementary plan; ₹ 1.72 crore and Additional fund: ₹ 13.60 crore.

¹⁷ Does not include ₹ 1.15 crore directly transferred to Ordnance Factory Board by MHA, GoI.

¹⁸ Does not include ₹ 1.26 crore directly transferred to Ordnance Factory Board by MHA, GoI.

¹⁹ ₹ 23.72 crore (Central Share as per plan) minus ₹ 2.41 crore (released directly to Ordnance Factory Board during 2016-18).

²⁰ ₹ 11.19 crore of 2013-14, ₹ 13.80 crore of 2014-15 and ₹ 14.57 crore of 2015-16 was utilised in subsequent years till March 2018.

Due to non-utilisation of Central share released up to 2015-16, Central share was not released by MHA during 2016-18. The State Government also did not release 70 per cent of its share during 2013-18

The State Government did not release corresponding State share of ₹ 52.25 crore and also could not utilise Central share of ₹ 4.22 crore during 2013-18

months) in sanctions by the Department as pointed out in Table 1 of Paragraph 2.1.8.2. Due to similar reasons, ₹ 4.22 crore²¹ pertaining to 2014-16 also remained unutilised as on 31 March 2018.

Thus, the Department did not release corresponding State share of ₹ 52.25 crore and could not utilise Central share of ₹ 4.22 crore during 2013-18 despite the fact that non-utilisation of Central share was highlighted **vide Paragraph 1.3.7 in CAG's Audit Report for the year 2008-09.**

During the exit conference (October 2019), the Department stated that action has been taken to spend the unutilised amount. Regarding non-release of funds during 2016-18, the Department stated that due to proposal for discontinuation of the Scheme, Central share was not released. The fact remains that MHA extended (February 2013) the Scheme for five years (2012-17) and in December 2017 for another three years (2017-20). It was further seen that the Central Government had intimated (March 2016 and April 2017) tentative allocation of Central share under the Scheme (2016-17: ₹ 8.54 crore and 2017-18: ₹ 11.24 crore).

Recommendation: The Department should ensure that Central funds are utilised in time and full component of State share is released.

Implementation of the Scheme

2.1.10 Weaponry

As the sophistication of weaponry used by criminals and LWE have increased considerably over the years, police forces need to be equipped adequately with state-of-the-art weapons to enhance their capability and effectiveness in combating such elements. MPF scheme as well as outlays sanctioned from State budget for modernisation and equipping the state police, envisaged replacement of obsolete weapons with sophisticated modern weapons and other equipment to effectively deal with situations such as violent demonstrations, riots, terrorists/Naxal attacks etc. This necessitates that not only the norms for equipping the police force are reviewed promptly but the adequacy of funds is also ensured and acquisition process managed effectively to provide modern arms and ammunitions to police in requisite quantity and capability, in a timely manner.

As per Rule 1090 of the Jharkhand Police Manual, indents for arms and ammunition received from units shall be compiled by PHQ and sent to the Central Government with intimation to the State Government. The Central Government in turn will send it to the ordnance depot for supply. Shortage and skewed distribution of weapons was highlighted **vide Paragraph 1.3.10.1 of CAG's Audit Report for the year 2008-09.** However, shortage and irrational

²¹ ₹ 0.66 crore of 2014-15 and ₹ 3.56 crore of 2015-16.

distribution of weapons still persisted as discussed in the succeeding paragraphs.

2.1.10.1 Availability of weapons

PHQ prepares firm demand every year showing requirement and availability of arms and ammunitions after need-based analysis of requirement of weapons by Operation and Training branches. Requirement of weapons is assessed based on the rate of authorisation for weapons²² and sanctioned strength of armed police personnel²³.

Position of weapons in the State as on 1 April 2013 and 31 March 2018 and procurement during 2013-18 is as shown in **Table 4**:

Table 4: Requirement, procurement, availability and shortage of weapons

Sl. No.	Type of arms	As on 1 April 2013			Procured/under supply during 2013-18	As on 31 March 2018		
		Requirement	Present holding	Shortage (per cent)		Requirement	Present holding including arms under supply	Shortage (per cent)
Main strike weapons								
1	5.56 Insas Rifle	36,705	35,731	974 (3)	3,516	40,989	39,247	1,742 (4)
2	AK 47 Rifle	9,434	5,000	4,434 (47)	401	10,535	5,401	5,134 (49)
3	5.56 SG 553	1,049	300	749 (71)	0	1,171	300	871 (74)
4	Sniper Rifle	525	85	440 (84)	0	585	85	500 (85)
5	9 mm Sig Pistol	6,835	500	6,335 (93)	194	10,741 ²⁴	694	10,047 (94)
6	9 mm Auto Pistol ²⁵	0	0	0 (0)	733	5,855	4,038	1,817 (31)
	Sub Total	54,548	41,616	12,932 (24)	4,844	69,876	49,765	20,111 (29)
Area weapons								
7	MP-5 A3/A4	1,048	0	1,048 (100)	0	1,170	0	1,170 (100)
8	5.56 Insas LMG	2,620	1,180	1,440 (55)	150	2,926	1,330	1,596 (55)
9	51 mm Mortar	525	452	73 (14)	0	586	452	134 (23)
	Sub Total	4,193	1,632	2,561 (61)	150	4,682	1,782	2,900 (62)
Supporting weapons								
10	UBGL ²⁶	1,049	550	499 (48)	0	1,171	550	621 (53)
11	VL Pistol	1,048	288	760 (73)	0	1,170	288	882 (75)
	Sub Total	2,097	838	1,259 (60)	0	2,341	838	1,503 (64)
	Grand Total	60,838	44,086	16,752 (28)	4,994	76,899	52,385	24,514 (32)

(Source: Firm Demands of Arms and Ammunition and Inventory of Arms)

Though the arms holdings in 2018 had increased over 2013 by around 19 per cent (8,299²⁷), there has been no improvement in bridging the shortage

²² The rate of authorisation shows the requirement of a particular category of weapon for certain percentage of sanctioned strength of armed police personnel.

²³ The district police force is divided into two categories namely district armed police (DAP) and ordinary reserve (OR) police. The State armed police force is considered as armed police force. OR is not supposed to carry weapons and requirement of weapon is assessed only for armed police.

²⁴ Firm demand showed requirement of 5,850 but should have been 10,741 as calculated by audit considering strength of the police force shown in the firm demand.

²⁵ Included in authorised list of weapons in 2015-16.

²⁶ Under Barrel Grenade Launcher.

²⁷ Including 3,305 pistols (9 mm auto) procured prior to April 2013/received from Bihar at the time of bifurcation.

Shortages of weapons had widened in 2018, due to less purchase of weapons during 2013-18

Procurement of weapons was well below the requirement due to paucity of funds. This also resulted in phased-out weapons being used for policing duties

The requirement of ammunition was incorrectly assessed as empty cartridges were also included in present holding

of weapons in 2018 over 2013. Rather in all these three categories of weapons, the shortages had widened in 2018, due to less purchase of weapons during 2013-18.

Against the actual shortage²⁸ of weapons during the period, only 7,003 weapons were included in the AAPs and only 4,994 weapons could be procured as funds were not released as pointed out in Paragraph 2.1.9.2. PHQ stated (August 2019) that weapons could not be purchased in specified quantities due to insufficient funds. However, the fact remains that the State Government could have prioritised procurement of weapons in the AAPs or could have released its share for the purpose. The State could also have earmarked a portion of funds provided for civil works in the State budget for weaponisation which is a vital component of modernisation.

Shortage of weapons caused dependency of the State police force on phased out²⁹ weapons such as SLRs, carbines and sten guns. PHQ admitted (August 2019) using phased out weapons along with new weapons.

While accepting the audit observations, the Department stated (October 2019) that it had carried out an assessment of actual requirement of weapons as of March 2019. Based on the actual sanctioned strength, the total requirement of weapons was worked out with major shortfall noticed in small arms. The Department further stated that steps have been taken to procure small arms and demand has been raised with Ordnance Factory Board.

2.1.10.2 Assessment of ammunition

Audit noticed that PHQ assessed a shortage of 12 lakh cartridges (5.56 mm) for Insas Rifle/ LMG as of March 2018 showing present holding of 1.55 crore cartridges³⁰. However, 58.78 lakh empty cartridges were also included in present holding leading to under assessment of 58.78 lakh cartridges which was 35 *per cent* of the required cartridges (1.67 crore). Further, audit could not assess sufficiency of 9 mm and 7.62 mm (SLR) ammunition needed for phased-out weapons like SLR, carbines and sten gun as PHQ neither maintained State-level inventory nor obtained data from the field units who had maintained inventory of weapons received from the State of Bihar at the time of creation of the State of Jharkhand. Shortage of ammunition had an adverse impact on target practice as discussed in Paragraph 2.1.14.3. The Department did not furnish any reply on the audit findings.

²⁸ April 2013:16,752, April 2014: 16,934, April 2015:18,431, April 2016: 18,939, April 2017: 18,465 and April 2018: 24,514.

²⁹ Weapons excluded from authorisation.

³⁰ Including 12 lakh under supply for which purchase order had been issued.

2.1.10.3 Supply of ammunition

Expired tear smoke shells were issued to tear gas squad due to non-supply by Ordnance Factory Board

The Department made advance payment (between December 2008 and September 2013) of ₹ 99.28 lakh to the Ordnance Factory Board for supply of 7.62 mm cartridges (84,080 Nos.), mortar bombs (450 Nos.), tear smoke shells (5,120 Nos.), detonating cord (100 metre) and RDX/WAX (2 kg). Against these requirements, the Ordnance Factory Board supplied (April 2011 to August 2014) 76,450 Nos. of 7.62 mm cartridges and 205 mortar bombs worth ₹ 47.80 lakh. The remaining items, for which advance payment of ₹ 51.48 lakh was made, were not supplied as of October 2019 despite regular reminders by PHQ to MHA. As such, all 10 JAP battalions with tear gas squads had only expired tear smoke shells, as intimated (May 2015) by DIG, JAP. Resultantly, expired tear smoke shells were issued (between November 2017 and February 2019) to tear gas squad of JAP 3 battalion for maintaining law and order.

No specific replies in this regard were furnished by the Department.

2.1.10.4 Distribution of arms and ammunition

Audit observed skewed distribution of arms and ammunition among field units (*Appendices 2.1.3 and 2.1.4*) with respect to rate of authorisation and sanctioned strength as detailed below:

There was shortage of main strike weapons in the test-checked districts, including in two LWE affected districts

- There was shortage of 30 to 68 *per cent* of main strike weapons in all nine test-checked districts. Further, two Left Wing Extremism (LWE) affected districts (Dhanbad and East Singhbhum) had shortage of 68 and 65 *per cent* while it was 43 and 48 *per cent* in non-LWE districts of Godda and Jamtara respectively.
- Six³¹ out of 12 test-checked SAPF battalions had shortage of two to 34 *per cent* of main strike weapons whereas remaining six³² battalions had excess by four to 23 *per cent*.
- Fifteen units were facing shortage of 13,079 main strike weapons and had only 3,419 (26 *per cent*) phased out weapons to meet the deficiency whereas six units already having 765 more main strike weapons in excess of authorisation also retained 2,703 phased out weapons.
- Similarly, the test-checked units had both excess of 1.82 lakh cartridges of 9 mm (29,943), AK-47 (1,07,534) and 7.62 SLR (44,056) over authorisation, as well as shortage of 72.08 lakh³³ cartridges of different calibre (*Appendix 2.1.4*) which indicates weaknesses in logistic planning.

There was skewed distribution of arms and ammunition among field units, with some having excess strike weapons while others were operating with phased out weapons

Thus, the Department did not ensure proper/ rational availability of arms and ammunition among field units. During the exit conference (October 2019), the

³¹ JAP 7, JAP 10, IRB 2, JJ (STF), SAP 1 and SAP 2.

³² JAP 1, JAP 2, JAP 3, JAP 5, JAP 6 and IRB 1.

³³ 9 mm (5.31 lakh), 5.56 mm (54.49 lakh), AK 47 (3.06 lakh) and SLR (9.22 lakh).

ACS stated that action will be taken to rationalize the distribution of arms and ammunition and if required, a committee will be set up to look into the matter.

2.1.11 Security equipment

2.1.11.1 Availability of Bullet-Proof (BP) jackets and helmets

Audit observed that no norms have been fixed by the Department for BP jackets. However, it was seen that the Department had planned (February 2001) to equip one company³⁴ of every battalion with BP jackets and BP helmets by 2005-06. Further, 3,500 BP jackets and BP helmets were sanctioned (February 2008 and September 2009) while raising the Jharkhand Jaguar (Special Task Force).

Audit observed that 9 out of 12 test-checked SAPF battalions had only 668 BP jackets and 586 BP helmets against required 900 needed to equip one company of each battalion. It was further noticed that while one battalion (JAP 1) had 334 BP jackets, eight battalions had only 3 to 57 BP jackets. In the remaining three test-checked battalions³⁵ including JJ (STF), there were no BP jackets. As such, the shortage of BP jackets ranged between 43 and 100 *per cent* (**Appendix 2.1.5**). JJ (STF) had also requested (between August 2017 and November 2018) PHQ to provide 400 BP jackets (10 for each Assault Group) for the safety of forces during operations. However, the same was not provided as of July 2019. Though provision for procurement of 330 BP jackets was included in AAPs of 2016-18, the same could not be procured as funds for the Scheme were not released during these years.

In the absence/shortage of BP jackets and helmets, operations undertaken by police forces are fraught with the risk of casualties. The Department did not compile data of bullet injuries/casualties owing to absence/shortage of BP jackets and helmets. Resultantly, the Department could not develop a standard operating procedure (SOP) for making it mandatory for the police personnel to wear BP jackets and helmets during operations.

The issue was also highlighted in **Paragraph 1.3.10.5 CAG's Audit Report for the year 2008-09**.

During the exit conference (October 2019), the ADG (Modernisation) stated that the major issue with BP jackets is its weight which affects the movement of troops during operations, particularly in hilly areas and that light-weight BP jackets are costly. The ADG (Modernisation) further stated that PHQ will compile and analyse data of bullet casualties owing to lack of BP jackets and also study the feasibility of developing SOP for using BP jackets.

There was shortage of bullet-proof jackets and helmets and some units did not have these at all

The Department did not develop an SOP making it mandatory for the police personnel to wear BP jackets and helmets during operations. Data of injuries/casualties due to absence/shortage of BP jackets and helmets was not maintained

³⁴ Consisting of 100 personnel.

³⁵ JAP-6, JJ (STF) and SAP-1.

2.1.11.2 Availability of other security equipment

There was shortage of metal detectors required by Special Branch for providing security cover due to paucity of funds

Security equipment like metal detectors, explosive detectors, bomb detectors, X-Ray scanners etc., are essential for security check. The Special Branch intimated (July 2017) PHQ that 2,029 security equipment³⁶ available with the State police were very old and out of these 1,345 equipment³⁷ (66 per cent) were non-functional and beyond repair. Special Branch had also demanded (between July 2017 and December 2018) 462 new security equipment³⁸. Though provision for 90 metal detectors was made in AAP for 2016-17, it was not procured as MPF funds were not released. However, the Department did not release the State share to procure the required metal detectors for reasons not on record.

Thus, there was shortage of security equipment required by Special Branch for providing security cover especially to VVIPs/ VIPs. PHQ accepted (August 2019) difficulties caused due to shortage of security equipment and stated that these were rotated from one place to another to meet the gaps. The Department further stated (October 2019) that the gaps in security items were being met on priority basis.

Recommendation: The Department should complete the mapping of assets and resources and identify sources of funds to procure weapons, communication sets, BP jackets and other security equipment and expedite the purchases to adequately equip the State police forces.

2.1.12 Mobility

Mobility is vital to the efficient and effective performance of the police force. It is measured in terms of the ability of the police force of a unit to move to the incident site. Quick response to law and order situations helps to save precious lives, maintain law and order and protect public and private property. Holding of adequate number of vehicles is essential for improving the mobility of police personnel. Police vehicles are divided into four categories viz., Heavy Motor Vehicles (HMVs), Medium Motor Vehicles (MMVs), Light Motor Vehicles (LMVs) and Very Light Motor Vehicles (three and two wheelers). Apart from these vehicles, the State police also require Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs) like mine proof vehicles, riot control vehicles, ambulances, mobile forensic vehicles, water tankers, prison vans etc.

Audit scrutiny revealed shortage of vehicles with field units including PSs and OPs as of March 2018 as discussed below:

³⁶ Door Frame Metal Detector (DFMD): 367, Deep Search Metal Detector (DSMD): 319, Hand Held Metal Detector (HHMD): 1170 and others: 173.

³⁷ DFMD: 310, DSMD: 230, HHMD: 693 and others: 112.

³⁸ DFMD: 125, DSMD: 10, HHMD: 300 and others: 27.

2.1.12.1 Availability of vehicles

The Department did not fix norms for vehicles to be attached with each police unit. However, as per norms³⁹ fixed by BPR&D in the year 2000, requirement and availability of vehicles for the State police as on March 2013 and March 2018 are as shown in **Table 5**:

Table 5: Requirement and availability of vehicles with the State police

Particulars	HMV	MMV	LMV	Motor Cycle	Total
Vehicles available as on 1 April 2013	240	956	2207	1777	5180
Requirement of vehicles as on 1 April 2013 ⁴⁰	849	930	1708	1874	5361
Shortage (-)/excess (+) as on 1 April 2013 (Per cent in brackets)	(-) 609 (72)	(+) 26 (3)	(+) 499 (29)	(-) 97 (5)	(-) 181 (3)
Vehicles purchased during 2013-18	0	233	1128	1150	2511
Vehicles declared off-road during 2013-18	40	172	409	177	798 ⁴¹
Vehicles available as on 31 March 2018	200	1017	2926	2750	6893
Requirement of vehicles as on 31 March 2018 ⁴²	915	971	2028	2335	6249
Shortage (-)/excess (+) as on 31 March 2018 (per cent in brackets)	(-) 715 (79)	(+) 46 (5)	(+) 898 (44)	(+) 415 (18)	(+) 644 (10)

(Source: BPR&D norms and records of PHQ)

The Department did not fix norms for different kinds of vehicles for its various police units to assess the actual requirement. There was shortage of Heavy Motor Vehicles

It can be seen from **Table 5** that though the availability of LMVs and Motor Cycles (MCs) improved over the period 2013-2018 covered in audit, shortage of HMVs had increased. Further, while nearly 20 per cent of the HMVs were off-road, no purchases were made. The PHQ stated (August 2019) that HMVs and MMVs had limitations in the hilly areas of Jharkhand and the forces were relying more on motorcycle squads as it was more responsive and less risky in areas with land-mines than HMVs and MMVs. However, the fact remains that the Department did not fix norms for different kinds of vehicles for its various police units to assess the actual requirement. During the exit conference (October 2019), the ACS of the Department agreed that PHQ should have its own need-based norms for procurement of vehicles and stated that shortages in this regard would be taken care of once the holistic blueprint of the organisation is prepared.

³⁹ (i) Armed Battalions: HMV-29, MMV-8, LMV-13, Motor Cycles (MC)- 5; (ii) District Police Line: HMV- 9 including 2 HMV for District Prison, MMV-18 including one for Sub-division, LMV-14 and MC- 7. (iii) Police Stations: LMV-2, Motor Cycles- 3 (iv) Police Out Posts: Motor Cycles-2.

⁴⁰ Calculated for 18 SAPF battalions (10 JAP, five IRB, two SAP and one SISF), 24 police lines, 39 Sub-divisions, 395 PSs, 81 OPs on BPR&D norms and for JJ (STF) 422 vehicles (MMV:250, LMV:144, Motor Cycle:28) as sanctioned by the Department in February 2008 and October 2009.

⁴¹ Condemned: 774, awaiting condemnation: 17, accident: 2 and awaiting major repairs: 5.

⁴² Calculated for 20 SAPF battalions (10 JAP, five IRB, two SIRB, two SAP and one SISF), JJ (STF), 24 police lines, 59 Sub-divisions, 521 functional PSs and 87 functional OPs.

There was acute shortage of drivers

Further, for plying 4,143 HMVs/ MMVs/ LMVs and 434 Special Purpose Vehicles⁴³, there was requirement of at least 4,577 police drivers⁴⁴ whereas the sanctioned strength and persons in position (PIPs) of the drivers were 4,105⁴⁵ and 2,455⁴⁶ respectively as of March 2018. PHQ stated (August 2019) that the shortage of drivers was being managed through Home Guards and police constables who were trained and possessing driving licenses. The Department stated (October 2019) that the process of framing of recruitment rules for driver constables is in its final stages and shortages would be addressed.

2.1.12.2 Distribution of vehicles

Police vehicles are procured centrally by PHQ as per need and distributed amongst the field units and various branches based on their demands.

Audit observed that three⁴⁷ out of nine test-checked districts had excess vehicles ranging from six to 114 *per cent* over BPR&D norms whereas six districts had shortages ranging from nine to 33 *per cent* as of March 2018. Similarly, out of 12 test-checked SAPF battalions, JAP-1 had 51 *per cent* excess vehicles whereas the remaining 11 battalions had shortages ranging between 20 and 56 *per cent* as of March 2018 (*Appendix 2.1.6*).

Audit further observed that:

- Test-checked 12 SAPFs battalions had overall shortage of 36 *per cent* of vehicles whereas nine test-checked districts had excess vehicles by seven *per cent* even though SAPFs were the frontline fighting force of the State.
- Audit observed that a provision for procurement of 3,442 motorcycles (MCs), being the safer mode of transport in rural and inaccessible jungle tracks of Jharkhand and less risky than HMVs and MMVs against landmines, were included in AAPs during 2013-18. However, only 1,150 MCs were purchased during 2013-18. As a result, 14 PSs (74 *per cent*) and five OPs (56 *per cent*) out of test-checked 19 rural/Naxal PSs and nine OPs did not have MCs as on March 2018 against the BPR&D norms of three and two MCs for each PSs and OPs respectively. PHQ attributed (August 2019) less purchase of MCs to budget constraints. However, the fact remains that the Department neither utilised funds of ₹ 4.22 crore available at its disposal as of March 2018 nor arranged resources from the State budget to meet the requirement approved under AAP. Further, even the available MCs were not rationally distributed as districts such as Latehar and Ranchi had

There was skewed distribution of vehicles

⁴³ Prisoners van, ambulance, recovery van, water tanker, riot control vehicles *etc.*

⁴⁴ As per Rule 1185 of Jharkhand Police Manual, for vehicles above 15 cubic weight *i.e.*, HMVs, two drivers should be sanctioned and for other vehicles one driver should be sanctioned.

⁴⁵ Havildar driver- 917 and Constable driver- 3,188.

⁴⁶ Havildar driver- 567 and Constable driver- 1,888.

⁴⁷ Hazaribag, Latehar and Ranchi.

200 *per cent* and 64 *per cent* excess holding of MCs respectively while Dhanbad and East Singhbhum had 68 and 61 *per cent* shortages respectively. Lack of vehicles would compromise the mobility of these units in effectively discharging their duties.

- Audit noticed that six⁴⁸ out of nine test-checked districts retained 16 to 30 LMVs at district headquarters against the BPR&D norms of 14 LMVs which led to shortage of LMVs with PSs. Out of 36 test-checked PSs of these six districts, nine PSs (25 *per cent*) had two LMVs, 10 PSs (28 *per cent*) had one LMV each whereas four (11 *per cent*) PSs had no LMVs against the norms of three LMVs to each PS. Thus, while there was excess LMVs at district headquarters, 64 *per cent* of test-checked PSs had lower number of LMVs than norms which could adversely affect response time⁴⁹.

Thus, the Department did not ensure rational distribution of vehicles among the districts and armed battalions though the fact was highlighted vide **Paragraph 1.3.9.2 of CAG's Audit Report for the year 2008-09**.

During the exit conference (October 2019), the ADG (Modernisation) stated that Enterprise Resource Planning would be made effective to analyse distribution of vehicles and other resources.

2.1.12.3 Response time

The Saraf Committee on Police Reforms opined that fixing of maximum response time is necessary to induct a sense of purpose and direction and recommended a maximum response delay time of five minutes in reaching the crime site. Rule 41 read with Rule 39 of the draft Model Police Manual (volume II) envisages that information of the commission of a cognisable crime that shall first reach the police, whether oral or written, shall be treated as first information and police station will immediately take action on the report received by it. Further, Jharkhand Police Unified Dial-100, a part of the State Emergency Response System aimed at reaching the location of the incident within 15 minutes, both in urban and rural areas.

Audit observed that PHQ did not fix response time on the grounds that 19 out of 24 districts of Jharkhand were LWE-affected. Audit analysed 545 illustrative Special Report (SR) cases⁵⁰ i.e., cases of serious nature in 41 test-checked PSs/OPs for the period from 2014 to 2018 and noticed that in 104 (19 *per cent*) cases, the response time was within 30 minutes. However, in 192 (35 *per cent*) cases, the response time was between 30 minutes to 60 minutes, in 133 (24 *per cent*) cases it was between 60-120 minutes while in the remaining 116 (22 *per cent*) cases, the response time was more than 120 minutes (**Appendix 2.1.7**).

⁴⁸ Dhanbad, Godda, Hazaribag, Koderma, Latehar and Ranchi.

⁴⁹ Duration between time of reporting of crime and time of reaching the place of occurrence of crime by police.

⁵⁰ Special Reports (SR) cases: dacoity, robbery, murder, riots, theft, professional drugging, accidents, atrocities *etc.*

Unsatisfactory response time of 234 minutes was also highlighted vide **Paragraph 1.3.9.3 of CAG's Audit Report for the year 2008-09.**

PHQ accepted the fact and stated (August 2019) that response time was normally 18 to 20 minutes in Ranchi city against a complaint lodged on Dial 100 and efforts were being made to fix response time for other cities and to minimise it in Ranchi.

However, in October 2019, the department stated that the concept of response time as mentioned in the Audit Report is erroneous because it is based on the time taken by the Investigation Officer (IO) in reaching the place of occurrence after FIR has been registered. It was further stated that response time should be calculated on the basis of response of Police Control Room (PCR) van, Highway Patrol or PS vehicles to reach the place of occurrence once the distress call is received through Dial 100.

The reply is not acceptable as the data of response time was collected by Audit from test-checked PSs with respect to response of PSs against information of crime received by them and is not based on time taken by IO to reach the place of occurrence after registration of FIR. Moreover, the control room of Dial 100 did not maintain any data showing time taken by police vehicles to reach the place of occurrence after receiving the distress call.

2.1.13 Communication Systems

Modern means of communication is the backbone of effective policing. High Frequency (HF)⁵¹, Very High Frequency (VHF)⁵² and Police Communication Network⁵³ (POLNET) are being used by the State police. Out of 26 POLNET stations established in the State during 2004-05, only 3 were working while 23 were non-functional due to various technical issues. As the existing POLNET infrastructure is being upgraded as stated (August 2019) by PHQ, the State police is mainly using VHF/ HF communication systems. Deficiencies noticed in the existing communication systems are discussed below:

2.1.13.1 Availability of communication equipment

To maintain a minimum level of communication, BPR&D prescribed (2001) scale of communication equipment for States/UTs to be achieved by 2006.

Requirement and availability of the communication sets viz., Repeaters, digital bases/mobiles and other hand held devices are shown in **Table 6:**

⁵¹ HF communication system is a long distance communication existing between the State capital and all the districts headquarters. It is used for one to one communication.

⁵² VHF communication system is a line of communication provided within the district. It is used for one to many communication.

⁵³ POLNET is a satellite based independent police telecommunication system to integrate police communication of the country through voice/FAX/data transmission, safe from interception of messages. The system is being revived as communicated to the State by GoI in May 2019.

Table 6: Requirement and availability of communication equipment

As on 1 April 2013		As on 31 March 2018	
Requirement	Availability (<i>per cent</i>)	Requirement	Availability (<i>per cent</i>)
12,334	10,100 (82)	12,909	10,687(83)

There was a 17 per cent shortage of communication equipment. Further, out of the available communication sets, nearly 40 per cent sets were non-functional. Out of the 6,465 communication sets in working condition 91 per cent were analog sets which are prone to interception

Audit observed that out of the available 10,687 sets, 4,222 sets (39.5 per cent) were non-functional due to expiry of life/equipment written off/ beyond economic repair. Thus, the Department was dependent on 6,465 sets (*Appendix 2.1.8*) with shortages of static, man pack and hand held devices ranging between 37 and 71 per cent.

While accepting the audit observation, the Department stated (October 2019) that steps are being taken to narrow the gap. During the exit conference (October 2019), the ACS of the Department stated that a complete blueprint of the communication system will be prepared for remedial action.

2.1.13.2 Absence of digital communication system

MHA instructed (December 2012) the States to give priority to digital communication sets in place of analog sets to protect police communication from interception⁵⁴. The Wireless Planning and Co-ordination (WPC) Wing, Ministry of Communication, GoI grants permission for frequency assignment⁵⁵ for the new digital sets purchased by the State police.

In the AAPs for 2016-18, the Department included provision for purchase of 1,090 digital VHF base/mobile and hand-held sets and placed (July 2018) a purchase order for supply of 808 digital sets⁵⁶ along with accessories for ₹ 1.25 crore. However, due to non-payment of outstanding spectrum charges of ₹ 15.47 crore (including late fee of ₹ 10.81 crore) for the period from 2004-05 to 2018-19, WPC did not grant the required permission and ultimately the ordered digital sets were not procured (November 2018).

Audit further noticed that out of the 6,465 communication sets in working condition as of March 2018, 5,878 sets (91 per cent) were analog sets which are prone to interception. Thus, even after a lapse of six years from the date of issue of instructions by MHA, the Department could not ensure interception free digital communication system.

In reply (August 2019), PHQ stated that spectrum charges could not be paid initially due to paucity of funds and the same had accumulated due to addition of late fee. The Department had tried to get the late fee waived leading to further delay. It was further stated that payment will be made during 2019-20.

⁵⁴ Coding is not possible in analog communication while it can be used in digital communication and hence analog communication is not suitable for communication of secret information.

⁵⁵ The change of location or equipment requires fresh application for frequency assignment.

⁵⁶ Repeater set: 8, digital base/mobile set: 250 and hand held set: 550.

During the exit conference (October 2019), ADG (Modernisation) admitted that there was shortage of four to five thousand digital communication sets and stated that a plan for ₹ 30 crore has been framed in this regard. The ADG also stated that spectrum charges of ₹ 4 crore would be paid this year (2019-20) and the balance would be cleared in the next financial year (2020-21). He further stated that action would be taken for erection of towers and for procurement of communication sets.

2.1.14 Training

Training is necessary to address the changing needs of the police force to introduce modern technological applications and skill development and ensuring their preparedness in executing their duties.

The Director General (DG), Training, under the Department is responsible for monitoring the training needs of the police personnel in Jharkhand. To cater to the training needs of police personnel in Jharkhand, there are six⁵⁷ police training institutes in the State. The Constable Training School (CTS), Musabani, notified in January 2015 was not operational till June 2019 due to ongoing construction work. Besides, four⁵⁸ Counter Insurgency and Anti-Terrorism (CIAT) schools were also established (between June 2010 and March 2013) on the pattern of CAPF to provide specialised training to tackle Naxal menace in the State. Various training courses⁵⁹, in addition to refresher courses, were also conducted in districts/ battalions' headquarters. Deficiencies noticed in training are discussed in the succeeding paragraphs.

2.1.14.1 Trainings conducted

Jharkhand Police Manual (JPM) stipulates provision for four-fold training to police personnel viz., (i) Initial on appointment; (ii) Promotional; (iii) Refresher; and (iv) In-service specialist.

The details of various categories of training imparted during 2013-18 are shown in Table 7:

Table 7: Different types of training imparted during 2013-18

Year	Person-in-position (PIP) as of March	Initial on appointment	Promotional	Refresher (Per cent of PIP)	Specialised Training	Total
2013-14	56,292	2,914	1,221	4,403 (8)	2,724	11,262
2014-15	55,593	703	968	5,689 (10)	3,600	10,960
2015-16	55,515	576	2,793	7,792 (14)	2,015	13,176
2016-17	56,209	1,136	4,530	2,370 (4)	3,502	11,538
2017-18	60,692	64	4,606	761 (1)	3,651	9,082
Total		5,393	14,118	21,015	15,492	56,018

(Source: ADGP, Training)

⁵⁷ 1. Jharkhand Police Academy (JPA), Hazaribag, 2. Jharkhand Armed Police Training Centre (JAPTC), Padma, 3. Traffic Training School (TTS), Jamshedpur, 4. Constable Training School (CTS), Musabani, 5. Jungle Warfare School (JWFS), Netarhat and 6. Investigation Training School (ITS), Ranchi.

⁵⁸ 1. CIAT School, Padma 2. CIAT School, Netarhat 3. CIAT School, Musabani and 4. CIAT School, Tendergram, Ranchi.

⁵⁹ Basic, Senior Leadership Course (SLC) and Special Promotional Course (SPC).

In three Counter Insurgency and Anti-Terrorism (CIAT) schools, established to provide specialised training to tackle Naxal menace 39 per cent trainees were imparted CIAT training without adhering to the age norms. Shortfall in specialised training to young troops was a reason behind non-deployment of State forces for sole anti-Naxal operations

Audit observed that:

- PHQ stipulated (November 2011) age norms⁶⁰ for imparting CIAT training, a specialised training. However, in three⁶¹ out of four test-checked CIAT schools, 884 trainees⁶² (39 per cent) were imparted CIAT training during 2013-18 without adhering to the age norms (*Appendix 2.1.9*). In reply, the Department stated (October 2019) that due to shortage of personnel, available police personnel from the field units were sent for CIAT training. Shortfall in specialised training to young troops was cited (August 2019) by PHQ as a reason behind non-deployment of State forces for sole anti-Naxal operations as discussed in Paragraph 2.1.17.2.
- As per instruction (August 2013) of the Training Directorate, refresher training is to be imparted once in two years to each police personnel. However, it can be seen from **Table 7** that only one to 14 per cent of police personnel were imparted refresher training against the requirement of 50 per cent of PIP every year.
- As per notification (January 2016) of PHQ read with Rule 649 of JPM, pre-promotional training of eight to 12 weeks is mandatory. However, 2,180 police personnel were promoted to higher posts of ASI to Inspector during 2016-19 without completing the mandatory pre-promotional training. Though 781 police personnel completed the pre-promotional training at a later stage, 1,399 police personnel were not imparted the training as of March 2019. PHQ accepted the facts and stated (August 2019) that some promoted officers who were exempted/ fell sick for a particular session would be accommodated in the future courses and would not be deemed confirmed in the promoted rank till they complete the training. However, the fact remains that training, though mandatory before promotion, was not imparted.

2.1.14.2 Training infrastructure

Audit scrutiny of records of eight⁶³ training institutes revealed the following deficiencies:

- Out of eight training schools, two schools viz., Jungle Warfare School (JWFS), Netarhat and Traffic Training School (TTS), Jamshedpur had no sanctioned strength of instructors, two schools (Jharkhand Police Academy (JPA), Hazaribag and Jharkhand Armed Police Training Centre, Padma) had no instructors against the sanctioned strength of five whereas in the

⁶⁰ Constables up to 30 years of age, Havildar up to 40 years and Officers up to 45 years.

⁶¹ 1. CIAT School, Musabani; 2. CIAT School, Netarhat and 3. CIAT School, Tendergram.

⁶² Constable- 629 out of 1,780; Havildar-191 of 367 and Officers-64 of 100.

⁶³ 1. Jharkhand Police Academy, Hazaribag; 2. Jharkhand Armed Police Training Centre, Padma; 3. Jungle Warfare School, Netarhat; 4. Traffic Training School, Jamshedpur; 5. CIAT School, Netarhat; 6. CIAT School, Musabani; 7. CIAT School, Tendergram, Ranchi; and 8. CIAT School, Padma.

Two training schools had no sanctioned strength of instructors, two schools had no instructors against the sanctioned strength of five whereas in four CIAT schools there was 46 per cent shortage of instructors. There was shortage of critical training equipment. Training institutes either did not have firing range or had firing ranges which were shorter than the prescribed norms. Trainees were not imparted the required target/shooting practice with different arms as per training curriculum due to non-availability of firing range of required specifications besides shortage of ammunition

remaining four CIAT schools, there were only 37 instructors against the sanctioned strength of 68. In reply, the Department stated (October 2019) that trainings were being imparted by retired police officers and other eligible officers deputed on contractual basis or by the officers of district police. It was further noticed that 3,063 (35 per cent) out of 8,824 police trainees imparted trainings in 16 sessions at four training institutes⁶⁴ during 2012-18 (*Appendix 2.1.10*), could not pass the final examination conducted after completion of training. PHQ while accepting (August 2019) the facts assured that these police personnel would not be deployed against jobs which required training.

- As per BPR&D norms, the training institutes should be equipped with training equipment to impart quality training. Audit noticed that in eight police training institutes, none had simulators, seven⁶⁵ had no body protectors, six⁶⁶ had no night vision devices, five⁶⁷ had no binoculars, four⁶⁸ had no audio-visual aids and three⁶⁹ had no wireless sets. Thus, non-availability of training equipment adversely impacted the quality of training imparted. PHQ accepted the facts and stated (August 2019) that training institutes would be equipped with simulators and other equipment depending upon the availability of funds.
- As per norms of BPR&D (2009), firing range of 400 meters should be available in training institutes to cater to the need of firing with different weapons. Audit noticed that out of eight training institutes, two⁷⁰ institutes did not have any firing range, three⁷¹ institutes had firing range of only 50 metres, one⁷² institute of 200 metres and two⁷³ had only 300 metres firing range. Audit further observed that in 11 test-checked units, 9,806 police personnel were imparted various types of training in 60 sessions during 2013-18. However, they were not imparted the required target/shooting practice with different arms as per training curriculum with shortfall ranging between seven and 99 per cent due to non-availability of firing range of required specifications besides shortage of ammunition (*Appendix 2.1.11*).

⁶⁴ 1. Jharkhand Police Academy, Hazaribag; 2. Jharkhand Armed Police Training Centre, Padma; 3. Jungle Warfare School, Netarhat; and 4. Traffic Training School, Jamshedpur.

⁶⁵ 1. JPA, Hazaribag; 2. JAPTC, Padma; 3. JWFS, Netarhat; 4. CIAT School, Netarhat; 5. CIAT School, Musabani; 6. CIAT School, Tendergram, Ranchi; and 7. CIAT School, Padma.

⁶⁶ 1. JPA, Hazaribag; 2. JAPTC, Padma; 3. TTS, Jamshedpur; 4. CIAT School, Netarhat; 5. CIAT School, Tendergram, Ranchi; and 6. CIAT School, Padma.

⁶⁷ 1. JAPTC, Padma; 2. TTS, Jamshedpur; 3. CIAT School, Netarhat; 4. CIAT School, Padma and 5. CIAT School, Tendergram, Ranchi.

⁶⁸ 1. TTS, Jamshedpur; 2. CIAT School, Netarhat; 3. CIAT School, Musabani and; 4. CIAT School, Tendergram, Ranchi.

⁶⁹ 1. JAPTC, Padma; 2. TTS, Jamshedpur and 3. JPA, Hazaribag.

⁷⁰ TTS, Jamshedpur and JPA, Hazaribag.

⁷¹ CIATs Musabani, Netarhat and Tendergram.

⁷² JWFS, Netarhat.

⁷³ CIAT, Padma and JAPTC, Padma.

Besides, firing practice from area weapons (Grenade, 51 mm Mortar and UBGL) was not imparted due to absence of specified firing range. PHQ accepted shortage of ammunitions as a reason for less target practice. Regarding firing ranges, PHQ stated (August 2019) that firing ranges available with BSF and Army were being used for long range firing purposes.

2.1.14.3 Target Practice

According to the provision of Jharkhand Police Manual (JPM) read with Training Directorate's instruction (February 2014), each police personnel should practice 40 rounds with the weapon (rifle or pistol⁷⁴) issued to them on a yearly basis. Audit noticed shortfall in annual target practice in 10 test-checked units during 2013-18 as depicted in **Table 8**:

Table 8: Details of Annual target practice

Total PIP during 2014 to 2018	No. of police personnel imparted annual target practice (Percentage)	Rounds to be fired at the rate of 40 per personnel	Total rounds actually fired	Target practice imparted (in per cent)
59,112	18,620 (31)	7,44,800	4,24,215 ⁷⁵	57

It can be seen from **Table 8** that police personnel were not imparted annual target practice as per norms. Test-checked units did not ensure target practice annually and shortfall ranged between 10 and 76 per cent (*Appendix 2.1.12*). While accepting the fact, the Department stated (October 2019) that police personnel were given firing practice according to availability of ammunition. Further, during the exit conference (October 2019), IG (Provisions) stated that PHQ maintained a reserve of ammunitions to handle special situations like Naxal operations, elections etc., and this caused short target practice. The ACS of the Department stated that remedial action will be taken in this regard.

Recommendation: The Department should ensure that the training institutions are adequately equipped with modern systems and facilities to impart quality training to the police personnel.

2.1.15 Forensic Science Laboratory

Forensic science is an essential and efficient enabler in the dispensation of justice in criminal, civil, regulatory and social contexts. Forensic set-up is one of the important components under the MPF scheme.

2.1.15.1 Forensic set-up

As per instructions (November 2001) of MHA read with the draft Model Police Manual, State Police Organisation should create a State level FSL, a Regional

⁷⁴ In case of constables and havildars who are issued pistols, 20 rounds with pistols and 20 with rifles.

⁷⁵ With rifles: 4,05,251 and pistols: 18,964.

FSL for every Police Range and a District Mobile Forensic Science Unit in every district.

A State Forensic Science Laboratory (SFSL) is operational in Jharkhand since 2005 along with forensic mobile units in 18 districts.

State Forensic Science Laboratory

After creation (November 2000) of Jharkhand, the Regional FSL situated at Ranchi was upgraded (December 2005) to SFSL. As per the notification (November 2012), the SFSL was to be made functional along with 14 divisions.

Though SFSL with nine⁷⁶ out of 14 divisions was functional as of December 2018, it lacked facilities and expertise for diatom (a group of algae) tests⁷⁷, death due to burns, drug tests etc. As a result, all 14 exhibits related to these cases were returned to the concerned investigating officers un-examined by SFSL during 2013-18.

The Department did not establish (December 2018) the remaining five divisions⁷⁸ required for analysis of cyber forensic, documentation, lie detection, photography and forensic engineering even after lapse of six years of notification (2012). Therefore, all 23 exhibits related to such cases were returned during 2013-18 by SFSL with instructions to send them outside the State for analysis.

Besides, three exhibits pertaining to wild life cases were returned as there was no facility for forensic examination of these cases in SFSL. It was further seen that facility for analysis of wild life cases was not included in the scope of SFSL. Thus, absence of above-mentioned facilities in SFSL may delay the pace of investigation.

In reply (October 2019), the Department stated that five divisions could not be established and exhibits were returned due to non-appointment of Assistant Directors and absence of a dedicated wild life forensic wing.

Regional Forensic Science Laboratories

Audit noticed that the Department did not initiate setting up of Regional FSLs required for seven police ranges⁷⁹ as of December 2018 for which no reason was furnished by the Department and SFSL. As such, responsibility for analysis of all exhibits rested with SFSL. This led to increase in dependence on SFSL resulting in delay/non-disposal of forensic cases as discussed in Paragraph 2.1.15.4.

⁷⁶ Biology Division, Ballistics Division, DNA Division, Explosive Division, General Chemistry Division, Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (NDPS) Division, Physics Division, Serology Division and Toxicology Division.

⁷⁷ Examination of cause of death in case of drowned dead body.

⁷⁸ Cyber forensic Division, Documentation examination Division, Lie-detection Division, Photography Division and Forensic Engineering and Instrument Division.

⁷⁹ Bokaro, Dumka, Hazaribag, Kolhan, Palamu, South Chotanagpur and Rail, Ranchi.

District Mobile Forensic Science Units (DMFSUs)

As per resolution (December 2005) of the Department, 18 mobile forensic units (mobile vans with forensic kits) were to be set up in the then existing 18 districts with a Senior Scientific Officer and a Scientific Assistant for each unit with adequate mobile forensic kits to collect and pack the exhibits scientifically.

Audit noticed that mobile forensic units were set up (December 2005) in 18 districts and police constables and head constables were deployed in these units after training by SFSL. However, the required Senior Scientific Officer and Scientific Assistant were not deployed in any of the mobile forensic units as of December 2018 due to non-recruitment in these cadres as Recruitment Rules were not finalised for fresh appointment.

The Department further notified (August 2011) setting up of seven additional mobile forensic science units for headquarters and the newly created six districts⁸⁰ but these were also not set up till December 2018.

Out of nine test-checked districts, mobile forensic vans were not available in Latehar and Jamtara while in the seven other districts, forensic kits in the mobile vans were either not available or had expired and these vans had also completed their prescribed life period⁸¹. As such, they were either non-operational or being used for other purposes such as carrying fuel and transporting ailing police personnel (*Appendix 2.1.13*).

Audit further observed from the files related to returned exhibits for 2013-18 that in 299 out of test-checked 339 cases, exhibits were returned by SFSL due to unscientific collection and packaging, absence of required documentation and mismatch of seal on packets of exhibits with seal on authority letters issued by investigating officers and courts as prescribed in JPM. This was mainly due to lack of trained manpower and forensic kits in the existing DMFSUs besides non-availability of DMFSUs in six districts. Lack of trained manpower was also reported vide **Paragraph 1.3.11.2 of CAG's Audit Report for the year 2008-09**.

State Forensic Science Development Board

The Department notified (September 2011) constitution of the State Forensic Science Development Board⁸² (the Board) chaired by the Chief Minister. The Board is responsible for framing policy for up-gradation and operation, to

⁸⁰ Jamtara, Khunti, Latehar, Ramgarh, Saraikela and Simdega.

⁸¹ As per circular (January 2003) of the Finance Department, GoJ the life period of medium/light vehicles is eight years or 1,50,000 km, whichever is earlier.

⁸² Chairman- Chief Minister, Vice Chairman- Home Minister, Member Secretary-Director, SFSL, Members- (i) Chief Secretary, (ii) Development Commissioner, (iii) Principal Secretary, Finance Department, (iv) Principal Secretary, Home Department, (v) Advocate General, (vi) Director General & Inspector General of Police, (vii) HoD, Forensic Medical Department, (viii) Director, Prosecution and (ix) Chief Forensic Science Scientist, Home Department, GoI.

monitor the functioning, to permit creation of various divisions as required and to approve the recruitment rules for manpower of FSL as well as to ensure its compliance. Further, the Director, SFSL was declared (April 2012) head of the office possessing administrative and financial powers along with technical matters.

Audit observed that the Board, though constituted in September 2011, did not frame policy for up-gradation and operation of FSL as of December 2018. Further, “Jharkhand State Forensic Science Laboratory Service Rules, 2012 (Recruitment Rules)” could not be finalised till October 2018 despite protracted correspondence between SFSL, the Department and the Jharkhand Public Service Commission (JPSC), the recruiting agency in this regard. As a result, recruitment of technical personnel could not be started as of December 2018 and there were vacancies in the scientific posts (Paragraph 2.1.15.3) while the Director and 32 Scientific Assistants were working on contractual basis. Thus, shortages of technical personnel affected the working of SFSL.

The Department accepted (October 2019) the audit observation and stated that new recruitments were in progress to fill the vacancies.

2.1.15.2 Accreditation of SFSL

State FSL needs accreditation from National Accreditation Board for Testing and Calibration Laboratories (NABL), a constituent Board of Quality Council of India (QCI)⁸³ for third party assessment of the technical competence of testing and calibration laboratories. For accreditation, the SFSL needed to meet the basic requirements⁸⁴ of manpower, infrastructure and management.

Audit noticed that the SFSL did not take action to get NABL accreditation even after a lapse of more than 13 years of its establishment (December 2005) due to lack of basic requirements like manpower, non-functioning of notified divisions and other infrastructural facilities. The Director, SFSL accepted (November 2018) the facts.

The Department further stated (October 2019) that accreditation is possible only after recruitment of required manpower as per guidelines of NABL.

⁸³ A Council set up in 1997 jointly by GoI and Indian Industry to establish and operate national accreditation structure and promote quality through National Quality Campaign.

⁸⁴ Manpower, infrastructure facilities, scientific and technical knowledge of scientists, examination procedure and system, format of work-sheets and reports, maintenance of records and case exhibits, budget provisions, Laboratory Information Management System, un-interrupted water and power supply, overall condition of the laboratory etc., as prescribed in Specific guidelines for accreditation of forensic science laboratory (March 2008).

2.1.15.3 Availability of manpower

As per Rule 1255 of Jharkhand Police Manual, the Director assisted by a Deputy Director is in overall charge of the laboratory. Each division of the laboratory is to be supervised by an Assistant Director duly assisted by one or more technical units with scientific officers. Non-technical staff are responsible for keeping exhibits safely and collection and dissemination of important information. Further, MHA instructions (December 2003) envisaged that modernisation/ upgradation of FSL would be meaningful only when the required scientific manpower is in position.

Audit noticed shortage of technical/scientific manpower in SFSL as of March 2018 as shown in **Table 9**:

Table 9: Sanctioned strength and persons-in-position of technical/scientific personnel

Sl. No.	Name of Post	Sanctioned Strength	Persons-in-position	Vacancy (Per cent)
1.	Director	1	1 (on Contract)	0 (0)
2.	Additional Director	2	0	2 (100)
3.	Dy. Director	5	0	5 (100)
4.	Joint Dy. Director	10	2 (Ballistic and Toxicology)	8 (80)
5.	Assistant Director/Sr. Scientific Officer	66	2 (Physics and Ballistic)	64 (97)
6.	Scientific Assistant	84	55 (Regular-23, On Contract-32)	29 (35)
	Total	168	60	108 (64)

Source: Director, State Forensic Science Laboratory, Ranchi

Shortage of technical manpower had an adverse impact on examination of exhibits as discussed in Paragraph 2.1.15.4.

Similarly, there was vacancy of 93 *per cent* (eight in position against strength of 112) in non-technical posts as on March 2018 (**Appendix 2.1.14**). These shortages also contributed to the pendency of cases due to engagement of technical personnel in non-technical work. Though the Director, SFSL requested (November 2013) the Department to provide non-technical manpower, the matter was stated to be still under process as of December 2018.

During the exit conference (October 2019), the ADG (Modernisation) stated that new recruitments were in progress to fill the vacancies.

2.1.15.4 Analysis of cases

According to the provisions of JPM, in normal course, exhibits would be examined in order of their receipt in the laboratory. However, exhibits likely to deteriorate due to being kept for a long time or on direction of the Court can be examined out of turn.

Audit noticed that the number of pending cases increased to 4,795 in December 2018 from 3,959 in January 2012. This included 381 cases pertaining to the

There was 64 per cent shortage of technical manpower in SFSL which had an adverse impact on examination of exhibits. 19 per cent of the exhibits were more than five years old. Further, there was 93 per cent vacancy in non-technical posts

period prior to 2012. Year-wise receipt and disposal of cases are detailed in **Table 10:**

Table 10: Status of cases received, disposed and pending

Particulars/Year	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	Total
Cases pending as on 1 st January of the year	3959	4671	5213	5569	5308	4582	4517	
Cases received during the year	1349	1499	1175	1383	1489	1907	1658*	10460
Total no of cases available for examination	5308	6170	6388	6952	6797	6489	6175*	14419
Cases disposed of during the year (Current + Old)	637	957	819	1644	2215	1972	1380*	9624
Cases pending as on 31 st December of the year	4671	5213	5569	5308	4582	4517	4795*	
Percentage of disposal	12	16	13	24	33	30	22	67

Source: Director, State Forensic Science Laboratory, Ranchi

* As on 01 October 2018

The major pendency was in the toxicology (71 per cent) and chemistry (19 per cent) divisions. Age-wise analysis of pending cases (**Appendix 2.1.15**) disclosed that exhibits were more than five years old in 19 per cent (934) of cases whereas these were one to five years old in 56 per cent (2,681) cases. It would be difficult to accurately analyse these old cases due to decomposition of ageing exhibits and may frustrate or delay the investigation and prosecution. Pendency of cases was also highlighted vide **Paragraph 1.3.11.1 of CAG's Audit Report for the year 2008-09.**

While accepting the audit observation, the Department attributed (October, 2019) shortage of manpower as a reason for pendency of cases. During the exit conference (October 2019), ACS of the Department stated that the Director, SFSL has been asked to frame a plan to clear pending cases and reduce backlog.

2.1.15.5 Infrastructural deficiencies

Audit noticed the following infrastructural deficiencies in SFSL:

- Additional forensic equipment viz., genetic analysers, latest Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) machines, boroscopes etc., though required (**Appendix 2.1.16**) for analysis of exhibits, were not available with five functional divisions. SFSL's proposal (March 2018) for purchase of these equipment was pending with PHQ as of March 2019.
- Absence of periodic maintenance of laboratory building led to damage in the ceiling, seepage and dampness all over the building including the indoor ballistic test fire range situated in the basement. Further, CCTVs, fire alert and fire alarm systems were not functional.
- Audit observed that SFSL could not ensure construction of vehicle shed and ramp required for safety and under chassis examination of the vehicles received as exhibits. In the absence of these facilities, risk of distortion/ damages of the exhibits due to exposure to weather conditions could not be ruled out.

➤ The library and museum, meant for knowledge up-gradation of the police personnel/ officials of SFSL as required under provision of JPM was not established as of October 2018.

While accepting the audit observation, the Department stated (October 2019) that action is being initiated for carrying out repairs of buildings and procurement of equipment.

Recommendation: The Department should establish the remaining five divisions of the SFSL, appoint technical and non-technical staff, take action to get NABL accreditation and finalise the “Jharkhand State Forensic Science Laboratory Service Rules 2012 (Recruitment Rules)” on priority.

2.1.16 Police infrastructure

Jharkhand Police Housing Corporation Limited (JPHCL) was nominated (February 2002) as the nodal agency for construction and maintenance of police buildings under MPF Scheme. Additionally, the Department executed civil construction works through Central Public Works Department (CPWD) and Building Construction Department, Government of Jharkhand.

Audit observed that during 2013-18, JPHCL took up 226 construction works for residential buildings, police lines, police stations, training institutes and other office buildings at an agreed value ⁸⁵of ₹ 479.28 crore (*Appendix 2.1.17*). Of this, 189 works were completed and 37 works, scheduled to be completed between December 2018 and September 2020, were in progress as of December 2018 as shown in **Table 11**:

Table 11: Status of works taken up by JPHCL

Nature of works taken up	No. of works taken up	Agreement value	No. of works completed	Expenditure on works completed	₹ in crore	
					No. of works in progress	Expenditure on works in progress
Residential	30	117.99	22	47.89	8	9.51
Police Line	103	157.12	92	100.09	11	10.89
Police Station	39	45.05	37	45.04	2	0.80
Training Institutes	40	154.73	25	81.62	15	22.23
Others	14	4.39	13	3.98	1	0.12
Total	226	479.28	189	278.62	37	43.55

Source: JPHCL

Despite focus on infrastructural development, the Department was far from achieving the desired satisfaction level⁸⁶ with respect to housing facility. Besides, other infrastructural deficiencies noticed during audit and joint physical verification are discussed in the succeeding paragraphs.

⁸⁵ Value of work as per agreements with the contractors.

⁸⁶ Measured with respect to actual availability of family accommodation *vis-à-vis* sanctioned strength of police personnel.

2.1.16.1 Residential quarters

BPR&D recommended (in the year 2000) *cent per cent* housing for all police personnel.

Audit noticed that the effective strength of the police force, which was around 22,000 at the time of formation of the State in 2000, had increased to 60,692 as of March 2018. However, the Department did not frame any plan for construction of adequate residential quarters. Though an amount of ₹ 62.29 crore was earmarked in the AAPs of 2013-18 for completing construction of four ongoing⁸⁷ police lines, only 448 Upper Subordinates (US)/Lower Subordinates (LS) quarters were taken up against the effective strength of 5,053 police personnel in these districts. Further, in the test-checked district of East Singhbhum, it was seen that only 332 US/LS quarters could be constructed up to March 2018 in addition to the 75 quarters in existence after formation of the State whereas the effective strength of the district police force was 3,120.

In four⁸⁸ out of 21 test-checked units, excluding JJ (STF) being deputation cadre, there were no residential quarters for police personnel against the sanctioned strength (Gazetted officers to Constables) and persons-in-position (PIP) of 4,794 and 4,305 respectively. In the remaining 16 units, there were 3,115 residential quarters as on March 2018 against the sanctioned strength of 31,186 and PIP of 25,704 (**Appendix 2.1.18**). Moreover, available quarters could accommodate only 8.66 *per cent* of police personnel of all test-checked units with respect to sanctioned strength (35,980) and 10.38 *per cent* with respect to PIP (30,009).

Audit further observed that satisfaction levels amongst Gazetted Officers (GOs), US⁸⁹ and LS⁹⁰ with respect to housing in test-checked units was 36, 18 and eight *per cent* respectively as of March 2018. As a result of inadequate number of quarters for constabulary, 18 police families of JAP 6 were residing in condemned (December 2013) LS quarters⁹¹ as of October 2018 as shown in the photographs.

There was shortage of residential quarters. Some police personnel were staying in condemned quarters. Thus, there was low satisfaction level of housing

⁸⁷ Giridih, Koderma, Latehar and Lohardaga sanctioned under MPF in 2005-06 and 2006-07.

⁸⁸ JAP 7, IRB 2, SAP 1 and SAP 2.

⁸⁹ Inspector to Assistant Sub Inspector.

⁹⁰ Head Constable and Constable.

⁹¹ K block-3, J block-10 and I block- 5.



Condemned residential quarters at JAP 6, Jamshedpur still in use (28 November 2018)

Thus, the improvement in the satisfaction level of USs and LSs (18 and eight *per cent* respectively) as of March 2018 was marginal in comparison to 12 and five *per cent* as reported vide **Paragraph 1.3.8.1 in CAG's Audit Report for the year 2008-09.**

2.1.16.2 Construction of police lines

MHA approved (September 2005 and September 2006) construction of five Police Lines⁹² (PLs) under MPF Scheme. However, these PLs remained incomplete after more than 11 years of commencement of work and incurring expenditure of ₹ 170.21 crore as summarised below and detailed in **Appendix 2.1.19.**

- Construction of PL at JAP 7, Hazaribag valued at ₹ 10.39 crore was taken up (December 2007) by the Building Division, Hazaribag without obtaining administrative approval (AA). Payment of ₹ four crore was made to the contractor against execution of work valued at ₹ 4.68 crore. The contractor approached (June 2012) the court for the remaining payment and the work was closed midway (January 2013) by the Executive Engineer (EE) after payment. The residual work with agreed valued of ₹ 15.42 crore, could be resumed (July 2017) only after revised technical sanction (December 2016) and administrative approval (April 2017). However, the work remained incomplete as of September 2019 despite expenditure of ₹ 19.56 crore.
- The Department granted (February and September 2009) AA for ₹ 126.52 crore for construction of four PLs and advanced (between January 2007 and March 2015) ₹ 108.97 crore to CPWD. However, CPWD did not intimate the Department in time about cost escalation due to awarding works at higher rates as required under CPWD Manual. CPWD submitted (March 2016 and February 2017) revised estimates due to cost escalation against which revised AA for ₹ 157.52 crore was granted (June 2017) and balance fund ₹ 48.54 crore was provided (between April 2015 and

⁹² Koderma, Latehar, Lohardaga, Giridih and JAP 7 (Hazaribag).

May 2018) to CPWD. As a result, projects⁹³ under PLs remained incomplete as of June 2019 despite incurring expenditure of ₹ 150.65 crore⁹⁴.

Thus, action of the executing agencies in commencing work without AA and delay in submitting revised estimates besides failure of the Department in releasing funds in time leading to non-completion of PLs. PHQ accepted (August 2019) the audit observation regarding failures of the executing agencies in communicating ground realities to PHQ and delay in providing funds to the executing agencies and stated that the works were expected to be completed in 2019-20. However, the fact remains that the PLs could not be completed and made operational even after 11 years of commencement.

2.1.16.3 Infrastructural deficiencies in test-checked PSs and OPs

As per BPR&D norms, PSs and OPs buildings should have adequate space with proper security and safety measures. In 62 test-checked PSs and OPs, Audit noticed shortage of facilities against prescribed norms (*Appendix 2.1.20*) as discussed below:

- Twenty-four (39 per cent) PSs/OPs did not have their own buildings, 27 (44 per cent) did not have separate lockup for male and female detainees, 39 (63 per cent) had no separate toilets for male and female, 47 (76 per cent) were without magazine for keeping weapons, 22 (35 per cent) were without boundary walls and 22 (35 per cent) were not secured with barbed wire fencing.
- Forty-seven (76 per cent) and 44 (71 per cent) PSs/ OPs had no watch tower and security posts respectively whereas 57 (92 per cent) did not have emergency alarm systems.
- Thirty-two (52 per cent) PSs/ OPs had no telephone facility, 56 (90 per cent) had no fax facility and 22 (35 per cent) were not covered under Crime and Criminal Tracking Network System (CCTNS). Close Circuit Television (CCTV) was not available in campuses or offices of 47 (76 per cent) PSs/OPs while generator was not available with 28 (45 per cent) PSs/OPs. Vehicles of 50 (80 per cent) PSs/OPs were not mounted with Global Positioning Systems (GPS).

Thus, PSs/ OPs of the State were facing shortage of buildings and other facilities and as such modernisation at the cutting edge level was yet to be achieved. During the exit conference (October 2019) the Department stated that a survey was under progress to identify infrastructural deficiencies at PSs/OPs and plans would be formulated accordingly.

PSs and OPs had infrastructural deficiencies such as lack of own buildings, boundary walls and barbed wire fencing, watch towers and security posts, emergency alarm systems, CCTVs, generators etc, absence of separate lockup for male and female detainees, lack of magazines for keeping weapons etc

⁹³ Construction of residential buildings for officers, guest house, hospital building, multipurpose hall and campus developmental works including internal roads and pipe laying at Latehar, campus developmental work including internal roads and pipe laying at Lohardaga and electrical works in all PLs were partially complete.

⁹⁴ Giridih: ₹ 37.68 crore, Koderma: ₹ 38.68 crore, Latehar: ₹ 35.32 crore and Lohardaga: ₹ 38.97 crore.

2.1.16.4 Results of joint physical verification

Joint physical verification of PSs/OPs and PLs revealed the following deficiencies:

District Police Lines

Godda and Jamtara districts did not have their own PLs and the personnel were accommodated in other congested and dilapidated buildings. Police line of East Singhbhum was in very poor condition and did not have parking sheds.

Infrastructural deficiencies were noticed such as toilets being used as store and office, hospital running in a dilapidated building, no toilets for female trainees, tents being used for stay at PL, toilets not maintained in hygienic condition



Basement of DC Office being used as barrack by police personnel of Jamtara district (30/10/2018).



Dilapidated verandah of PL used as barrack by police personnel of Godda district (12/10/2018).



Vehicles including SPVs parked in the open at East Singhbhum PL (23/10/2018).



Room with damaged ceiling being used as Reserve Office at East Singhbhum PL (23/10/2018).

SAPF Battalion and Training Institutes

SAP 2 battalion did not have PL and was using the toilets of JAP 6 PL as store and office. Police Hospital of JAP 6 was running in a dilapidated building. JWFS, Netarhat did not have toilets for female trainees. Personnel of JJ (STF) were using tents for stay at PL. Toilets of barrack of JAP 6 at Jamshedpur were not found maintained in hygienic condition.



Toilets being used as store and office by SAP 2 battalion at Jamshedpur (26/10/2018).



Makeshift toilet arrangement for female trainees at JWFS, Netarhat (01/11/2018).



Police hospital running in extremely damaged building at JAP 6 battalion at Jamshedpur (28/11/2018).



Tents being used as barrack by forces of JJ (STF) battalion at Ranchi (21/12/2018).



Poor condition of toilets inside barrack of JAP 6 at Jamshedpur (28/11/2018).

Police Stations and Outposts

Mango PS, East Singhbhum, Sadar and Nagari PSs, Ranchi and Meharna PS, Godda were running in old, dilapidated and congested buildings and lacked basic facilities.



Building of Sadar PS, Ranchi which needs immediate repair (20/12/2018).



Dilapidated office of Mango PS, Jamshedpur (30/10/2018).



Congested and poor condition of building of Nagari PS, Ranchi (20/12/2018).



Poor condition of building of Meharma PS, Godda (10/10/2018).

Recommendation: The incomplete civil works should be completed at the earliest and put to use. Survey to identify infrastructural damages/deficiencies in PSs, OPs and PLs may be completed at the earliest and a time-bound plan should be drawn up to address the shortcomings.

2.1.17 Human Resource management

2.1.17.1 Strength of State police forces

The sanctioned and actual strength⁹⁵ of the State police force as on March 2018 is shown in Table 12:

Table 12: Sanctioned strength and PIP of Inspector to Constable

Year (as on 31 March)	Sanctioned strength (SS)			Person-in-Position (PIP)		
	Officers (Assistant Sub Inspector to Inspector)	Constabulary (Head Constable and Constable)	Total	Officers (Percentage of SS)	Constabulary (Percentage of SS)	Total (Percentage)
Civil (Districts and other units) Police Force						
2013	9055	46289	55304	6070 (67)	35895 (78)	41965 (77)
2014	9055	46289	55304	5803 (64)	36279 (78)	42082 (76)
2015	9058	46289	55347	6057 (67)	35521 (77)	41578 (75)
2016	9404	47079	56483	6236 (66)	34827 (74)	41063 (73)

⁹⁵ Except the strength of two battalions of Special Auxiliary Police (SAP) where retired army personnel are posted on contractual basis and the battalion of Jharkhand Jaguar (Special Task Force) where state/ district police personnel are deputed on rotational basis.

2017	15634 ⁹⁶	47079	62713	8696 (56)	32205 (68)	40901 (65)
2018	15673	42070	57743	8570 (55)	36034 (86)	44604 (77)
Increase (2013 to 2018)			2439			2639
State Armed Police Forces						
2013	1107	16300	17407	951 (86)	13230 (81)	14181 (81)
2014	1107	16300	17407	804 (73)	13406 (82)	14210 (82)
2015	1107	16300	17407	928 (84)	13087 (80)	14015 (81)
2016	1301	17880	19181	935 (72)	13517 (76)	14452 (75)
2017	1354	18916	20270	843 (62)	14465 (76)	15308 (76)
2018	1411	20349	21760	810 (57)	15278 (75)	16088 (74)
Increase (2013 to 2018)			4353			1907 (44)
Total increase			6792			4546 (67)

(Source: Information furnished by PHQ)

Audit scrutiny revealed that:

Against the sanctioned police-population ratio of 233 per one lakh population, the actual ratio was 178

Delay in notifying revised Recruitment Rules for the posts of Inspector to Constable resulted in recruitment of only 54 per cent police personnel

- As per 'Data on Police Organisations' as on 01 January 2018 compiled by BPR&D, the sanctioned police-population ratio of Jharkhand was 233 per one lakh population against the national average of 193. However, the actual ratio was 178 due to vacancies in the posts of Constables to Inspectors. Large scale vacancies persisted despite the issue being flagged in **Paragraph 1.3.12.1 of CAG's Audit Report for 2008-09**.
- Audit noticed that there were frequent changes, including fixing higher qualification criteria⁹⁷, and delay in notification of Recruitment Rules for Constable to Inspector after creation of the state of Jharkhand in November 2000. The Department notified revised Recruitment Rules for the posts of Constable to Inspector only between January 2015 and March 2017. This resulted in recruitment of only 9,568 (54 per cent) police personnel (constable to sub-inspector) during 2013-18 against the proposed recruitment to 17,765 posts as of March 2018.
- The Committee on Police Reforms, 2000 (Padmanabhaiah Committee) had recommended reduction in recruitment of constabulary and increase in the number of officers in Police Department. Audit noted that while the Government had increased the sanctioned strength of officers in the Civil Police force, correspondingly decreasing that of the constabulary in 2017-18, it had increased the sanctioned strength of both officers and constabulary in the State Armed Police Force. Further, the Committee suggested that the ratio of officers to men should be improved to 1:4. While the ratio of SS in Civil Police Force improved from 1:5.1 to 1:2.7, for SAPF it remained almost constant at 1:14. Further, in SAPF the MIP ratio of officers to men in 2018 was 1:19.

⁹⁶ In January 2016, 6,148 posts of officers were created and equivalent posts of constables surrendered (June 2017).

⁹⁷ Higher physical standard for constable and sub-inspector, higher cut-off for written test and interview for sub-inspector, less chance and higher service condition for departmental exam for sub-inspector.

As against MPF Scheme guidelines to include about 30 per cent of women in the total strength of the police force, there were only 4 per cent women police personnel

- MPF Scheme guidelines (2017) stressed upon necessary legislation, if necessary, to include about 30 per cent of women in the total strength of the police force. The MHA had also issued (between September 2009 and May 2014) advisories to the State governments to increase the representation of women to 33 per cent of the total strength of the police personnel in the States. Audit observed that as against the sanctioned strength of 79,503 personnel as on 31 March 2018 the number of women police personnel was only 3,228⁹⁸ (four per cent). With the increasing incidents of crime against women and children, the shortfall in women police personnel indicated a critical gap in the police force's ability to deal with such cases.

PHQ stated (August 2019) that shortages in the ranks of investigating officers and young SIs was the reason behind non-deployment of State forces for sole anti-Naxal operations and non-disposal of old cases. The Department further stated (October 2019) that steps are being taken for recruitment. Regarding representation of women, it was stated (December 2019) that, at present, reservation of 33 per cent is being implemented in recruitment to the police force.

2.1.17.2 Operational efficiency

Operations are being planned mainly by concerned SPs at the district level. The strength of forces from district, SAPFs and CAPFs to be engaged in an operation is decided by SPs concerned and drawn from the forces stationed in the districts except Assault Groups (AGs) of Jharkhand Jaguar (JJ) Special Task Force (STF)⁹⁹ which was provided by PHQ on demand.

- To counter challenges from LWEs, the State engaged 16 battalions of CAPFs in 2010 which increased to 24 in 2013 and remained static till December 2018. The State also engaged forces from 19 SAPFs battalions¹⁰⁰ and District Armed Police (DAP) in anti-Naxal operations. Details of anti-Naxal operations carried out in the State from January 2014 to December 2018 with operational results is given in **Table 13**:

Table 13: Details of operations and operational results (in numbers)

Year	Operations carried out				Operational results with reference to Naxals		
	Special	Long Range patrolling	Inter State	Total	Killings	Arrests	Surrender
2014	1,082	1,216	46	2,344	10	516	12
2015	986	1,195	36	2,217	25	458	13
2016	1,609	1,429	53	3,091	21	527	39
2017	2,977	1,647	66	4,690	12	608	47
2018	2,658	1,601	55	4,314	26	515	16
Total	9,312	7,088	256	16,656	94	2,624	127

Source: Information furnished by PHQ

⁹⁸ As of February 2019.

⁹⁹ It was created (February 2008 and October 2009) with 40 Assault Groups on the pattern of Greyhound, Andhra Pradesh to check Naxal activities in the State and to reduce dependence on CAPFs.

¹⁰⁰ JAP-10, IRB-5, SISF-1, SAP-2 and JJ (STF)-1.

State level force-wise (Central and State) sole and joint anti-Naxal operations data was not furnished to audit

- PHQ did not provide State level force-wise (Central and State) sole and joint anti-Naxal operation data to Audit as a result of which overall participation of the State forces in anti-Naxal operations carried out in the State could not be analysed.

Out of nine test-checked districts, 4,752 operations were conducted during 2014 to 2018 in seven districts as shown in **Table 14**.

Table 14: Details of operations in test-checked districts

Year	By CAPF	Joint	Sole	Total operations	Percentage of sole operations to total operations	Percentage of sole and joint operations to total operations
2014	400	74	35	509	6.9	21.4
2015	343	190	6	539	1.1	36.4
2016	650	180	19	849	2.2	23.4
2017	934	328	107	1369	7.8	31.8
2018	940	433	113	1486	7.6	36.7
Total	3267	1205	280	4752		

Source: Information furnished by test-checked districts

As can be seen from the above table, in the test-checked seven districts the number of anti-Naxal operations were on an increasing trend. Out of 4,752 operations conducted between 2014-2018, 3,267 (69 per cent) operations were conducted solely by CAPFs, 1,205 (25 per cent) operations jointly by CAPF and the State forces and 280 operations (six per cent) solely by the State forces (**Appendix 2.1.21**). Audit also noticed that JJ (STF), created especially to check Naxal activities, participated in 2,376 joint operations with CAPFs (1,492) and the State police forces (884) as detailed in **Appendix 2.1.22**.

- To make JJ (STF) efficient and effective, PHQ fixed (March 2008) age norms of *havildar* and constables (22 to 27 years) and ASI to Inspector (25 to 40 years). However, Audit noticed that 1,862 (68 per cent) out of 2,739 constables to Inspectors were beyond age norms¹⁰¹ in JJ (STF) as of December 2018.

PHQ accepted lower number of operations by State forces and attributed (August 2019) shortage of young troop leaders and better trained constables for non-deployment of JJ (STF) for sole operations. Regarding operational dependency on CAPFs, PHQ stated (August 2019) that the State was at a tipping point in curbing the Naxal menace and needed retention of CAPFs for another two to three years.

Audit further noticed that while the State Government continued to be dependent on the Central forces for curbing the Naxal menace, the outstanding dues including penalty payable by the State Government to GoI towards deployment of Central forces was ₹ 7,481.35 crore as of March 2018.

During the exit conference (October 2019), ADG (Modernisation) stated that now Assault Groups of JJ (STF) and Small Action Teams (SATs) constituted

¹⁰¹ Maximum age- Constables: 48 years; *havildars*: 54 years; ASI: 53 years; SI: 58 years and Inspectors: 55 years.

Sole operations by State forces accounted for only 6 per cent of total operations

within SAPFs and districts were carrying out operations on their own. The ADG further stated that two battalions of CAPFs have been withdrawn from the State recently. The ACS of the Department stated that a vacuum could not be created at once because of threat of resurgence of Naxalism.


Recommendation: The Department should review the preparedness, skills and competencies of the State police to carry out effective Naxal operations and deal with problems of public order and internal security. The young troop leaders and trained constabulary should be exposed to the best available training similar to the training imparted to CAPFs.

2.1.18 Crime in Jharkhand

2.1.18.1 Crime registration and investigation

Registration and investigation of crime is one of the main functions of police. The crime scenario in Jharkhand showed a mixed trend during 2014-18 as depicted in Chart II below.

Chart II: Registration and disposal of cases (including pending cases)



(Source: Information furnished by PHQ)

The status of registration and investigation of cases in the State and test-checked districts from January 2014 to December 2018 is given in **Table 15**:

Table 15: Details of registered crime and its disposal

Name of units	Cases pending as on 1 January 2014	Cases registered during 2014 to 2018	Total registered cases	Cases disposed during 2014 to 2018	Percentage of disposal
State	20,505	2,82,394	3,02,899	2,73,205	90
Test-checked districts					
Deoghar	1,540	16,473	18,013	16,255	90
Dhanbad	1,675	26,914	28,589	26,528	93
Godda	666	9,479	10,145	9,377	92
Hazaribag	1,731	18,442	20,173	16,940	84
East Singhbhum	1,400	22,418	23,818	21,872	92
Jamtara	265	6,005	6,270	5,707	91
Koderma	468	7,027	7,495	7,138	95
Latehar	289	4,962	5,251	4,866	93
Ranchi	2,100	38,486	40,586	35,679	88

Source : Information furnished by ADG (CID)

In the test-checked districts 41 per cent of pending cases were not concluded within the timelines prescribed

Rule 173 (c) of JPM prescribes a maximum timeline of one year for disposal of cases. Audit noticed that in nine test-checked districts, 5,761 (41 per cent) out of 14,168 pending cases (between September 2018 and January 2019) were not concluded for more than one year (**Appendix 2.1.23**) beyond the timeline¹⁰². These included 524 cases pending for more than six years, 979 cases for four to six years and 4,258 cases for one to three years with the oldest case pertaining to year 1985.

While accepting the audit observation, the Department attributed (October 2019) pendency of cases to shortage of investigating officers.

2.1.18.2 Cyber-crime

Cyber threats are increasing for governments, commercial enterprises, industries and above all ordinary citizens. As per manual on Cyber-crime investigation issued (April 2016) by the National Investigation Agency (NIA), GoI, there should be Cyber-crime Police Stations (CCPSs) at the State and district level. Additionally, there should be a Cyber Academy at the State level and Digital Investigation Laboratory (DIL) with each CCPS to tackle cyber-crime cases.

Audit noticed that the State-level CCPS at Ranchi became functional from March 2016. At the district level, CCPSs were established (December 2017) in six¹⁰³ out of 24 districts. However, Cyber Academy needed for imparting training in forensic analysis, network security, network and call tracking and onsite analysis and DILs required for detailed scientific analysis were not established as of December 2018. Further, the existing CCPSs had inadequate manpower and shortage of modern equipment as discussed below:

- At the State level CCPS, against 44 sanctioned posts, persons-in-position were only 10 (23 per cent) as on December 2018. Further, in the six district-level CCPSs, no technical post was sanctioned and against sanctioned strength of 168 non-technical posts, PIP was only 66 (39 per cent) as of December 2018 with shortage ranging between 43 and 86 per cent (**Appendix 2.1.24**).
- Modern and updated equipment such as password cracking tool and finger print-iris scanner required for investigation of cyber-crime cases were not available with the State and district level CCPSs as of December 2018. The

Cyber Academy at the State level and Digital Investigation Laboratory with each cyber-crime Police Station to tackle cyber-crime cases was not established. The existing CCPSs had inadequate manpower and shortage of modern equipment. No technical posts were sanctioned. As a result, only 26 per cent of cyber-crimes registered during 2013-2018 could be disposed of

¹⁰² (i) Investigation of category 'A' special reports (SR) cases like dacoity, robbery, murder, riots etc., should be completed within three months subject to extension of three months by the Superintendent, further six months by the range DIG and after one year by the Inspector-General, (ii) investigation of category 'B' SR cases like theft, professional drugging, accidents, atrocities etc., should be completed within two months subject to extension of one month by the Sub-Divisional Police Officer, (iii) investigation of some classes of SR cases (professional and heinous crime) and Non-SR cases must be finished within one month subject to extension in the manner as applicable for category 'A' and 'B' SR cases and (iv) investigation of other cases should be completed in 10-15 days.

¹⁰³ Deoghar, Dhanbad, Giridih, Jamshedpur, Jamtara and Palamu.

State-level CCPS was functioning with limited forensic tools and devices while district-level CCPSs were fully dependent on the State-level CCPS. No provision was made in the AAPs under MPF Scheme during 2013-18 for procurement of these equipment.

- Absence of manpower and required scientific investigation facilities affected speedy investigation of cyber-crimes during 2013 to 2018 as only 702 cases (26 per cent) out of 2,719 registered cyber-crime cases were disposed of.

During the exit conference (October 2019), ADG (Modernisation) stated that technically qualified manpower from the newly recruited sub-inspectors would be deputed in CCPSs. The ACS of the Department further stated that action would be taken for imparting specialised cyber training to the concerned personnel and a centralised cyber cell at the State level with adequate equipment for tackling cyber-crimes would be set up.

2.1.19 Field Inspections

Rules 32, 39 and 69 of Jharkhand Police Manual stipulate annual and half yearly inspection of PSs falling under jurisdiction of Superintendents of Police (SPs), Sub Divisional Police Officers/Deputy SPs and Circle Inspectors (CIs).

Audit noticed that inspections done by SPs, DSPs and CIs were far too short during January 2014 to September 2018 in 35 test-checked PSs/OPs under seven¹⁰⁴ out of nine test-checked districts as shown in **Table 16**.

Table 16: Inspection of PSs/OPs by SPs, DSPs and CIs

Name of Functionary	Inspections required	Nos. of Inspections conducted	PSs/OPs Inspected	PSs/OPs not inspected even once	Shortfall (Per cent)
SP	175	35	21	14	140 (80)
DSP	175	61	24	11	114 (65)
CI	350	54	23	12	296 (85)

(Source: Information furnished by the test-checked PSs)

Thus, shortfall in conducting inspections of PSs/OPs by higher authorities led to non-assessment of infrastructural deficiencies at the PSs/OPs levels and delay in investigation of cases.

2.1.20 Audit conclusion

The State Police Board has not been created to frame policy guidelines and evaluate organisational performance against identified performance indicators. The department had not prepared any long term or medium term perspective plan to systematically identify capabilities/infrastructure gaps and allocate adequate financial resources to modernise and strengthen state police in an efficient and timely manner. Framing of the five-year strategic plan by mapping

¹⁰⁴ Deoghar, Dhanbad, East Singhbhum, Godda, Jamtara, Latehar and Ranchi.

assets and resources, identifying gaps and setting up milestones to bridge these gaps has just begun in 2019-20. Area specific internal security scheme has also not been framed.

The Department did not release State share of ₹ 52.25 crore under MPF Scheme and Central share of ₹ 4.22 crore¹⁰⁵ could not be utilised as of March 2018. Further, the AAPs were submitted with delays up to 168 days leading to consequential delay in release of central funds and subsequent loss of central grants of ₹ 21.31 crore due to poor pace of utilisation. As a result, the AAPs were not fully implemented during 2013-18. The limitation of funds under MPF Scheme was also not adequately and rationally supplemented from the State budget.

Though the Department improved its availability of weapons in April 2018 over its position in April 2013, the shortages have increased from 28 *per cent* (April 2013) to 32 *per cent* (April 2018). The Department did not ensure rational distribution of the available arms and ammunition among field units. Similarly, distribution of cartridges were also skewed. The State police are still dependent on phased out weapons as procurement of required weapons was not adequately prioritised in the AAPs. The State police have been facing acute shortage of BP jackets and helmets.

The Department neither fixed norms for different kinds of vehicles for its various police units nor ensured their rational distribution among districts and armed battalions. Out of 545 Special Report Cases analysed in 41 test-checked Police stations/Out posts, the response time was more than two hours in 116 (22 *per cent*) cases.

The State police is mainly dependent on analog system of communication which is susceptible to interception. Digital sets could not be procured for want of new frequency assignment due to non-payment of spectrum charges by the Department. Modernisation of FSL within the State, necessary for speedy scientific investigation of cases, was not given proper attention. Shortage of trained and technically qualified manpower in the SFSL coupled with shortage of facilities resulted in delay in analysis of exhibits for one to five years.

All police personnel were not provided the required training. CIAT training was imparted without adhering to age norms. Police personnel were not imparted target/shooting practice with different types of weapons as per norms due to non-availability of firing range of required specifications and shortage of ammunition.

There were large scale vacancies in the Inspector to Constable cadre. Housing facilities for police personnel were not sufficient and the satisfaction level amongst Gazetted Officers, Upper Subordinates and Lower Subordinates with respect to housing was low. Test-checked PSs and OPs lacked basic

¹⁰⁵ Received during 2014-16.

infrastructural facilities and security arrangements. Construction of five Police Lines remained incomplete 11 years after commencement of work.

The deficiencies pointed out in Paragraph 1.3 of the Audit Report of the Comptroller & Auditor General of India (Civil and Commercial) for the year ended 31 March 2009 continued to exist.

The State police continue to be dependent on the CAPFs for curbing the Naxal menace. Analysis of security operations in the test-checked districts revealed that 69 *per cent* operations were conducted solely by CAPFs, 25 *per cent* operations jointly by CAPF and the State forces and only six *per cent* solely by the State forces. JJ (STF), created especially to check Naxal activities, participated in joint operations with CAPFs and the State police forces. Thus, the State could not reduce dependency on CAPFs.

